The Rise of Directed Verdict: Jury Power in Civil Cases Before the Federal Rules of 1938 by Lerner, Renée Lettow
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2013 
The Rise of Directed Verdict: Jury Power in Civil Cases Before the 
Federal Rules of 1938 
Renée Lettow Lerner 
George Washington University Law School, rlerner@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Renée Lettow Lerner, The Rise of Directed Verdict: Jury Power in Civil Cases Before the Federal Rules of 
1938, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448 (2013). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
The Rise of Directed Verdict: Jury Power
in Civil Cases Before the Federal
Rules of 1938
Rene´e Lettow Lerner*
ABSTRACT
Jury practice in the state and federal courts evolved dramatically in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Around the time of the ratification of
the Bill of Rights in 1791, important legal thinkers praised the civil jury as a
bulwark against judicial tyranny.  By the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938, many commentators regarded the civil jury as an anti-
quated nuisance.  Diminishment of the jury and open exercise of judicial
power, encouraged in the Federal Rules by procedures such as summary judg-
ment, would not have been possible without earlier changes in jury practice.
Two major changes were the rise of directed verdict procedure and the related
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  These mechanisms allowed a judge to
give a binding instruction to a jury, or to enter a judgment contrary to the
jury’s decision.
This Study reveals that railroads revolutionized the law of jury control.
Changes in directed verdict were part of a larger program of jury reform be-
ginning in the mid-nineteenth century in England, the states, and the federal
government.  Because of growing numbers of complicated personal injury
suits against railroads, and because of perceived jury bias in those cases, many
judges sought to control juries more efficiently.  Directed verdicts began to
replace new trials.  Opposition arose, but the overall trend was toward greater
judicial control of juries.  The striking changes in jury practice described in
this Article suggest difficulties in maintaining a consistent jury trial right by
constitutional requirement.
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INTRODUCTION
Civil jury practice in the state and federal courts evolved dramati-
cally in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  A major part of
that evolution was the directed verdict and the related judgment not-
withstanding the verdict.  These mechanisms allowed a judge to give a
binding instruction to a jury, or to enter a judgment contrary to the
jury’s decision.1  Courts justified these procedures on the theory that
the facts were for the jury to determine and the law for the judge—a
line that proved to be highly malleable.
Previous scholarly studies of directed verdict have emphasized
the procedure’s early history in England and the United States, its
constitutionality under the Seventh Amendment, and its development
1 The current versions in the Federal Rules are Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(a)
and (b) (Judgment as a Matter of Law and Renewing the Motion After Trial).  I do not address
directed verdict in criminal cases in this Article.  The practice existed in criminal cases, but it was
rarer than in civil cases.  Courts generally allowed juries more power in criminal cases than in
civil, in part through the doctrine of double jeopardy.  In certain circumstances, judges directed
verdicts for criminal defendants; in some jurisdictions, judges even directed verdicts of guilty.
See, e.g., People v. Richmond, 26 N.W. 770, 770 (Mich. 1886); Recent Decisions, Criminal Law
and Procedure—Jury Trial—Directed Verdict of Guilty—Michigan Rule, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1234,
1234 (1941).
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in the federal courts.2  In general, scholarship on American civil pro-
cedure has focused on the period before 1791—because of the Sev-
enth Amendment’s historical test3—and on the advent and
consequences of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and af-
ter.  The period in between has been comparatively neglected.4  There
is a vast difference, however, between the procedural worlds of 1791
and 1938.  The diminishment of the jury and the open exercise of judi-
cial power encouraged by the Federal Rules in procedures such as
summary judgment would not have been possible without the changes
in jury practice made in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
This Study helps to fill the gap, to explain how the Federal Rules and
the modern procedural world became possible.
Modest jury controls existed in 1791, but around that time major
figures in the American legal world lauded the power of civil juries as
a bulwark against tyranny.5  In 1771, John Adams wrote that, in order
2 See, e.g., William Wirt Blume, Origin and Development of the Directed Verdict, 48 MICH.
L. REV. 555 (1950); Frank Warren Hackett, Has a Trial Judge of a United States Court the Right
to Direct a Verdict, 24 YALE L.J. 127 (1915); Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the
Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966); Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh Amendment
and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 573 (2003); Ann Woolhandler &
Michael G. Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587 (2001).  For useful sources on state
practice, see ROBERT W. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 305–09 (1952); 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 296–99 (3d ed. 1940).
3 See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446–48 (1830); United States v. Wonson, 28
F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
4 Some exceptions are Amalia Kessler, Stephan Landsman, John Leubsdorf, William Nel-
son, and Ellen Sward. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW:
THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830 (1975); Amalia D.
Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alter-
native to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005); Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in
America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579 (1993); John Leubsdorf,
Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 1984, at 9; William E. Nelson, Civil Procedure in Twentieth-Century New York, 41 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1157 (1997); Sward, supra note 2.  On the paucity of scholarship about the history
of the American civil jury (together with interesting observations on that history), see Lawrence
M. Friedman, Some Notes on the Civil Jury in Historical Perspective, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 201,
201–02 (1998).
5 The case of Erving v. Cradock, in which a Boston civil jury nullified the unpopular
customs laws by finding against a customs officer who had seized a merchant’s ship carrying
smuggled cargo, demonstrated to American colonists the power and value of the civil jury.  Er-
ving v. Cradock (1761), reprinted in FRANCIS BERNARD, Governor Francis Bernard to the Lords
of Trade, 6 Aug. 1761, 2 BERNARD PAPERS 46, 47, reprinted in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF
CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE
OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 553–55 (Boston 1865).  American colo-
nists resented the expansion of the jurisdiction of admiralty courts, which sat without a jury, to
enforce the customs laws. See, e.g., Resolves of the Stamp Act Congress, October 1965, in RICH-
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to correct judicial overreaching, it was not only a juror’s “right but his
Duty . . . to find the Verdict according to his own best Understanding,
Judgment and Conscience, tho in Direct opposition to the Direction of
the Court.”6  A decade later Thomas Jefferson wrote likewise.7  Rights
to civil juries were considered important enough to be enshrined in
state constitutions and to be called “sacred.”8  The lack of a civil jury
guarantee in the federal Constitution posed a serious obstacle to rati-
fication, cured quickly by the Seventh Amendment.9  In the first jury
trial conducted by the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice
John Jay charged a civil jury in 1794 that, although the jury usually
decided the facts and the judge the law, the jurors had “a right to take
upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as
the fact in controversy.”10
By the early twentieth century, however, many legal commenta-
tors and judges regarded civil juries less as a bulwark against tyranny
than as a nuisance.  In 1914, Edson Sunderland, a principal drafter of
ARD MIDDLETON, COLONIAL AMERICA: A HISTORY, 1585–1776, at 452 (2d. ed. 1996) (“That
trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies. . . .
[The Stamp Act] and other Acts, by extending the jurisdiction of the courts of admiralty beyond
its ancient limits, have a manifest tendency to subvert the rights and liberties of the colonists.”).
6 John Adams, Adams’ Diary Notes on the Right of Juries, 12 Feb. 1771, in 1 LEGAL
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 228, 230 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
7 Jefferson stated:
[I]t is usual for the jurors to decide the fact, and to refer the law arising on it to the
decision of the judges.  But this division of the subject lies with their discretion
only.  And if the question relate to any point of public liberty, or if it be one of
those in which the judges may be suspected of bias, the jury undertake to decide
both law and fact.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 140 (J.W. Randolph ed., 1853).
8 The Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, for example, declared: “That in controver-
sies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury is prefera-
ble to any other, and ought to be held sacred.” VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 11
(Jun. 20, 1776), reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS
50 (William Swindler ed., 1979).
9 Concern about the lack of a civil jury right in the federal Constitution was a major
unifying theme of the Anti-federalist movement.  Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins
of the Seventh Amendment, 87 IOWA L. REV. 145, 182, 185 (2001); Jack N. Rakove, The Origins
of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1064 (1997).  Debtors’ fears
that creditors would sue them in federal courts sitting without juries caused significant opposi-
tion to the proposed Constitution, particularly in Southern states.  Harrington, supra, at 188–89;
Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV.
639, 679–705 (1973).
10 Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794).  The Court was sitting in original
jurisdiction.  For a description of the procedure, see 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 84 n.70 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1998).
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the Federal Rules of 1938,11 published a long article entitled The Inef-
ficiency of the American Jury.12  He remarked: “Men temporarily
called from the ordinary affairs of life, untrained in the law, are inca-
pable of performing the functions of judges in any but the most primi-
tive communities.”13  Judges strove to control the law in civil cases,
and through ever more precise rules transformed what had been is-
sues of fact for the jury into issues of law for the judge.  Far from
allowing a jury to find the law in opposition to the direction of the
court, courts approved of trial judges threatening jurors with con-
tempt for rejecting a directed verdict.14
This Study examines changes in directed verdict as part of a
larger program of jury reform beginning in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury in England, the states, and the federal government.  It is hardly
an exaggeration to say that railroads revolutionized the law of jury
control.  In all these jurisdictions, the numbers of personal injury suits
rose dramatically as railroad tracks spread.15  Railroads’ ability to
transport goods and persons quickly and cheaply made them vital to
the new commercial and industrial economy.16  As they steamed
along, however, they killed or injured workers, passengers, passersby,
crops, and livestock in large numbers.17  They therefore provoked
popular hostility.18  Judges in all these jurisdictions faced the problem
of how to process large numbers of complicated personal injury cases,
compensate victims, and maintain the financial viability of railroads
confronted with hostile juries.19  The solution was to sharply limit jury
power.20  In particular, judges sought to reduce the number of new
trials and to control juries more efficiently through nonsuits and di-
rected verdicts.21
Not all judges agreed with the program of limiting jury power.
Although many judges were clearly concerned about adjudicatory ef-
11 Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 697–729 (1998).
12 Edson R. Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MICH. L. REV. 302
(1914).
13 Id. at 303.
14 See, e.g., Curran v. Stein, 60 S.W. 839 (Ky. 1901).
15 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 300 (2d ed. 1986); infra
Part III.A.6.
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See, e.g., infra Part III.A.6.
20 See infra Part III.A.
21 See infra Part III.A.5–6.
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ficiency and about jury bias against corporations, others worried more
about compensation for the numerous persons injured in railroad and
other industrial accidents.22  Populist movements influenced legisla-
tures as well, and various statutes and even constitutional provisions
attempted to restore jury power in personal injury cases.23
Part I of the Article begins with a brief examination of English
methods of jury control in the late eighteenth century.  Part I also
addresses the difficulties posed by the remedy of new trial—the most
widespread method for correcting jury error in the United States in
the early nineteenth century.  The Article in Part II then turns to di-
rected verdict, and discusses its variations in different states in the first
half of the nineteenth century.  During this period, a growing desire
for finality and clarity in commercial cases led to more directed ver-
22 Scholars have vigorously debated the goals and effects of nineteenth-century tort law.
See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 467–87 (arguing that many rules of tort law in the nine-
teenth century protected enterprises, especially railroads, at the expense of plaintiffs, but that
judges, juries, and legislatures increasingly favored compensation of plaintiffs as the century
wore on); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at
85–101 (1977) (arguing that the development of negligence doctrine in the nineteenth century
undermined an earlier “presumption of compensation for injury” and substantially reduced en-
trepreneurial liability, amounting to a subsidy for economic development); MORTON J. HOR-
WITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 13–14, 43–44, 51–59 (1992) (arguing that influential late-nineteenth-century legal
writers tried to construct a system of private law free from the dangers of redistribution, and
embraced theories of negligence and rejected strict liability of enterprise); PETER KARSTEN,
HEART VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 79–143 (1997)
(criticizing Morton Horwitz and Lawrence Friedman, and arguing that tort rules such as negli-
gence and the fellow servant rule were not new in the nineteenth century, and that courts often
applied the rules, or allowed juries to apply the rules, in ways that permitted injured plaintiffs to
recover); JOHN F. WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 43–70 (2004) (describing a shift during the
nineteenth century from a focus on individual autonomy to compensation, particularly for de-
pendent wives and children); Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Cen-
tury America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1720 (1981) (criticizing Horwitz and
Friedman, examining tort cases in California and New Hampshire, and concluding that “the
nineteenth-century negligence system was applied with impressive sternness to major industries
and that tort law exhibited a keen concern for victim welfare,” with the exceptions of employers’
liability and governmental liability in California); Jed H. Shugerman, A Watershed Moment: Re-
versals of Tort Theory in the Nineteenth Century, 2 J. TORT L., no. 1, art. 2 (2008) (arguing that
courts in the 1870s and 1880s justified a negligence rule partly by economic arguments, but
around the turn of the century justified strict liability rules for enterprises on moral grounds);
Stephen F. Williams, Transforming American Law: Doubtful Economics Makes Doubtful His-
tory, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1187 (1978) (arguing that the requirement of fault and the thread of
utilitarian analysis is found far back in the English common law, and that Horwitz distorts the
concept of a subsidy).
23 See infra Part III.C.
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dicts for defendants.  Some states adopted a variation known as in-
structing the jury “as in case of a nonsuit.”24
In the second half of the nineteenth century, as described in Part
III, directed verdict practice changed significantly.  Courts changed
the standard for using the procedure, coinciding with the spread of
railroads.  The change in standard for directed verdict also tended to
follow closely the abolition of disqualification of witnesses for inter-
est.25  New York and English courts were among the first to modify
the procedure to allow directed verdict even when there was some
evidence for the opposing party.26  Federal courts then changed the
standard, followed by state courts other than New York.27  Directed
verdict thus evolved from a strict standard to a more permissive one—
an evolution that occurred for other procedures of jury control or
avoidance at different times.  For example, in the early nineteenth
century, the standard for ordering a new trial for verdict against evi-
dence evolved from being allowed only if there was no evidence at all
for the opposing party, to being permitted even if there was evidence
on the other side.28  Likewise, in the twentieth century, the standard
for granting summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure was interpreted more permissively.29
Part III also discusses substantive tort doctrines that enabled
courts to direct more verdicts for defendant railroads, including con-
tributory negligence and the fellow servant rule.  Use of these doc-
trines provoked a backlash.  Some courts, together with legislatures
and even constitutional conventions, modified or abolished these bar-
riers to plaintiffs’ recovery.  Constitutional provisions in two states at-
tacked directed verdicts directly, and provided that the issues of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk must be decided by
juries.30  The U.S. Supreme Court issued significant opinions concern-
24 See infra Part II.F.
25 See infra Part III.A.1.
26 See infra Part III.A.2–3.
27 See infra Part III.A.5–6.
28 See Rene´e B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in Early
Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 542–46 (1996).
29 See the summary judgment trilogy: Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); An-
derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
30 ARIZ. CONST. art. XVIII, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, § 6; see also infra text accompa-
nying notes 349–53.
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ing both of these provisions.31  A few state legislatures tried to bar
directed verdicts, but these statutes met resistance in the courts.32
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts in-
creasingly did away with the requirement that a judge actually direct a
verdict and obtain agreement from a jury before judgment could be
entered.  The requirement had sometimes led to awkward confronta-
tions between judges and recalcitrant jurors.33  Appellate courts began
to allow judgment to be entered on the mere decision to direct a ver-
dict.34  The pretense of jury power fell away, and judges exercised
power ever more openly.  These changes created a legal culture will-
ing to accept novel practices such as the powerful summary judgment
procedure in the Federal Rules of 1938.35
Difficulties began to arise because judges faced pressure to de-
cide motions for directed verdict quickly, and they often erred by de-
nying motions.36  Although judges were willing to make changes in the
procedure of directing a verdict, they hesitated to permit entry of
judgment notwithstanding a jury’s verdict.37  As Part IV discusses, leg-
islatures began to authorize both trial and appellate courts to grant
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in 1895.38
Part V shows that the principal drafters of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were deeply interested in the new forms of jury con-
trol, including directed verdict.  They wrote about them extensively in
their academic work.39  The drafters viewed civil juries as wasteful
anachronisms.40  The growing power of judges over jury verdicts al-
lowed the drafters to take the next logical step: avoidance of jury trial
31 See Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931); Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cole,
251 U.S. 54, 55–64 (1919); see also infra text accompanying notes 358–66.
32 See infra Part III.C.3.
33 See infra Part III.D.
34 See, e.g., Cahill v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 74 F. 285 (7th Cir. 1896); see also
infra note 464 and accompanying text.
35 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (1938).
36 See, e.g., Dalmas v. Kemble, 64 A. 559, 559 (Pa. 1906) (explaining the pressure on trial
judges to decide directed verdict motions quickly); Robert L. Pierce, Practice and Procedure—
Reservations of Decision on Motion for Directed Verdict as Means of Avoiding Unnecessary New
Trials, 34 MICH. L. REV. 93, 93 (1935) (commenting on judges’ errors in denying motions for
directed verdict due to time pressure); see also infra text accompanying notes 477–79.
37 See infra notes 483–84 and accompanying text.
38 See, e.g., 1895 Minn. Laws 729–30; see also infra notes 485–88 and accompanying text.
39 See, e.g., Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE
L.J. 423, 423 (1929); Charles E. Clark & Harry Shulman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases—A Study in
Judicial Administration, 43 YALE L.J. 867 (1934); Edward R. Sunderland, Directing a Verdict for
the Party Having the Burden of Proof, 11 MICH. L. REV. 198 (1913); Sunderland, supra note 12.
40 See, e.g., Sunderland, supra note 12.
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altogether.  The Rules’ provisions for extensive pretrial discovery,
combined with a powerful new summary judgment procedure, allowed
judges to decide issues without ever summoning a jury.41  Although
the original Advisory Committee had to be somewhat cautious in
drafting Rule 50, concerning directed verdicts,42 in the mid- and late-
twentieth century the Advisory Committee amended the Rule to strip
out any role for the jury and to make judicial power plain.43
The more aggressive use of directed verdicts in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries drew criticism from some com-
mentators as violating constitutional rights to jury trial.44  The
dramatic evolution of jury practice described in this Article suggests
difficulties in maintaining a consistent jury trial right by constitutional
requirement.  Judges have many ways to expand the realm of law at
the expense of fact, and can devise many methods at different points
in litigation to interpose judicial decisions.  In addition to practices
explicitly concerning taking a case from a jury, many features of the
legal system strongly affect jury decisions and review of those deci-
sions: the substantive law, the law of pleading, the complexity of dis-
putes, the law of discovery, the cost of litigation and fee-shifting rules,
methods of jury selection, the law of evidence, the power of the trial
judge to comment on evidence at trial, and methods of recording testi-
mony and bringing the record before an appellate court, just to name
a few.  All of these have changed greatly since the English common
law practice of 1791.  The procedural rights listed in the Bill of Rights
can sound majestic, but they are subject to manipulation at many
levels.
I. BACKGROUND TO DIRECTED VERDICT
A. Jury Control in English Courts in the Eighteenth Century
English judges had many ways to guide juries in the eighteenth
century.  The attaint had long been obsolete and Bushell’s Case pro-
hibited fining jurors for incorrect verdicts,45  but English judges still
could exercise considerable control.  The most powerful tool was judi-
41 See supra Part V.
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) (1938); see infra text accompanying notes 527–29.
43 Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 31
F.R.D. 587, 643 (1963); see infra notes 530–32 and accompanying text.
44 See infra note 402.  A different paper will address constitutional challenges and the
courts’ responses.
45 Bushell’s Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.) 1011–12, Vaughan 137, 147.
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cial comment on the evidence.46  Sometimes a judge’s notes or a re-
ported opinion described a trial judge as “directing” a verdict.47  The
jury usually found according to the judge’s instructions and comments;
in those rare cases in which the jury brought in a contrary verdict, the
judge had the ability to grant a new trial for verdict against law or
evidence.48
Several devices permitted a judge to avoid a jury verdict entirely.
Demurrer to the evidence was one such tool, but it’s use declined in
the late eighteenth century as oral testimony became increasingly im-
portant at trial.49  A defendant, by demurrer to the evidence, could
challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence to maintain the plain-
tiff’s case.  English judges believed the procedure was especially ap-
propriate in cases that turned on matters of record, deeds, or other
writings.50  Cases turning on oral testimony, however, proved a chal-
lenge for the procedure; it was hard to be certain what inferences to
draw from oral testimony, with its potential conflicts and credibility
questions.  In Cocksedge v. Fanshaw51 in 1779, Lord Mansfield stated
that in demurring to the evidence, “the defendant admits every fact
which the jury could have found upon the evidence” in favor of the
plaintiff.52  Demurrers to the evidence were rare in late-eighteenth-
century practice.53  The procedure’s use further declined after the
House of Lords’ decision in Gibson v. Hunter54 in 1793, which re-
quired the defendant to state in writing not only the evidence intro-
duced by the plaintiff, but also the facts which such evidence might
prove.55  Few defendants wanted to be on record in this fashion.56
A different way to avoid a jury verdict was nonsuit of the plain-
tiff.  Nonsuit in effect substituted for demurrer to the evidence, with-
out the necessity for defendant to admit the truth of plaintiff’s
46 See John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263,
285–86, 295 (1978).
47 See JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERI-
CAN SPECIAL JURIES 12–13 (2006).
48 Id. at 12; John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View
from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1193 (1996).
49 See MILLAR, supra note 2, at 298.
50 JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
235–36 (1898).
51 Cocksedge v. Fanshaw, (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 80 (K.B.), 1 Dougl. 118.
52 Id. at 88 (Lord Mansfield) (emphasis added); see id. at 88–89 (Buller, J.).
53 OLDHAM, supra note 47, at 10.
54 Gibson v. Hunter, (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 499 (H.L.), 2 H. BL. 188.
55 Id. at 509–10.
56 See THAYER, supra note 50, at 235–36.
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evidence.  In an action in which the plaintiff had failed to make out a
legally sufficient case, the court could direct a nonsuit or the plaintiff
could move for one.57  Although there has been some scholarly debate
about whether an English judge could order a nonsuit without the
plaintiff’s consent, James Oldham has found that Mansfield was doing
so.58  Oldham also found that nonsuits were frequent, according to
Mansfield’s notes.59
Another device Mansfield frequently used was the “case stated”
or “case reserved.”60  Under this procedure, the jury gave a verdict for
the plaintiff, with a finding of damages, subject to the opinion of the
court on a question of law.61  The trial judge and counsel for the par-
ties agreed on the statement of the case.62  The legal question was then
argued before the full court, and a judgment could be entered for de-
fendant as a result, without another jury trial.63  (If a verdict was for
the defendant, a plaintiff could argue a question of law on a motion
for new trial.64)
B. Jury Control in the United States: The Problem of New Trial
The most frequent procedure for correcting jury error in Ameri-
can courts was to order a new trial.65  Use of other methods of correc-
tion declined.  Demurrer to the evidence became rare in the federal
courts and in many states when courts adopted the English rule of
Gibson v. Hunter, requiring the defendant to admit in writing to ad-
verse inferences from oral testimony.66  (States whose courts did not
adopt Gibson v. Hunter continued use of the demurrer, most notably
Virginia.67)  Most importantly, in many states in the nineteenth cen-
tury, trial judges’ power to comment on evidence to the jury was lim-
ited or curtailed.68  With few other options for preventing or
57 MILLAR, supra note 2, at 299–300.
58 OLDHAM, supra note 47, at 11–12.  Henderson argued that an English plaintiff could not
be nonsuited without his consent.  Henderson, supra note 2, at 300.
59 OLDHAM, supra note 47, at 10.
60 Id. at 12–13; see Henderson, supra note 2, at 304.
61 OLDHAM, supra note 47, at 10–11; Henderson, supra note 2, at 305–06.
62 Henderson, supra note 2, at 305–06.
63 Id.
64 OLDHAM, supra note 47, at 13.
65 Lettow, supra note 28, at 524.
66 See, e.g., Young v. Black, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 565, 568 (1813); Copeland v. New England
Ins. Co., 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 135, 138–39, 142 (1839).
67 See, e.g., Patteson v. Ford, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 18, 28 (1845); MILLAR, supra note 2, at
301–02.
68 See Kenneth A. Krasity, The Role of the Judge in Jury Trials: The Elimination of Judi-
cial Evaluation of Fact in American State Courts from 1795 to 1913, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 595,
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correcting jury error, American courts turned increasingly to new
trial.
New trial, however, was a costly remedy, adding the delay and
expense of another jury trial.  As the numbers of complicated tort
cases grew in the late nineteenth century, concerns about docket pres-
sure increased.69  In the late nineteenth century, courts and commen-
tators complained about the inefficiency of new trial.70  By the early
twentieth century, such laments had become common.  One of the
best-known was Roscoe Pound’s address to the American Bar Associ-
ation in St. Paul in 1906, later published as The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice.71  Pound called the
“lavish” granting of new trials “the worst feature of American proce-
dure,” and claimed that over forty percent of reported state appellate
decisions resulted in a new trial.72
A 1935 article in the Michigan Law Review gave three reasons
why the remedy of new trial had proved “eminently unsatisfactory.”73
First, “it submits the aggrieved party to the delay, annoyance, and cost
of a re-litigation which will undoubtedly end in his favor anyway if the
memories of his witnesses have not become dulled by the passage of
time.”74  Second, the practice offers “a temptation to an unscrupulous
party, defeated on the appeal, to manufacture evidence to conform
with an appellate court’s opinion.”75  Third, “it clogs further already
overburdened court dockets.”76
C. Modification of New Trial Procedure in the United States and
England: The Partial New Trial
Some state courts developed innovations in new trial procedure
to try to limit delay and expense.  In Massachusetts, for example,
courts since at least the 1830s used a procedure that could be called
595–96 (1985); Rene´e L. Lerner, The Transformation of the American Civil Trial: The Silent
Judge, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 195, 197–99 (2000).
69 JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENE´E L. LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 755–57 (2009).
70 See, e.g., Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 116, 122 (1874); Meyer v. Houck, 52 N.W.
235, 237 (Iowa 1892).
71 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 178 (1937) (reprinting Pound’s 1906 address to the American Bar
Association).
72 Id. at 185.
73 Pierce, supra note 36, at 93.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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the partial new trial.  Unlike in England at the time, a court in that
state could limit a new trial to a particular issue of fact, for example,
assessment of damages.77  This procedure prevented trying the entire
case over again.  A number of other state courts later approved this
limitation of new trial to a particular issue in an appropriate case.78  A
few state courts, however, refused to allow a partial new trial and re-
quired the entire case to be tried again.79  Even courts which did allow
the procedure warned on occasion that it should be exercised “with
caution,” because it was often difficult to separate issues in a case, to
be sure that a jury’s determination of one issue would not affect
another.80
The inefficiencies of the remedy of new trial were recognized in
England as well, and in the late nineteenth century, Parliament and
the English courts also limited retrials.  The Judicature Acts (Appel-
late Jurisdiction Act of 1876) authorized English courts to grant par-
tial new trials.81  In addition, the Act of 1876 provided that courts
were not to grant new trials for misdirection of the trial judge or for
improper admission or rejection of evidence unless “some substantial
wrong or miscarriage has been thereby occasioned.”82  A leading com-
77 See, e.g., Simmons v. Fish, 97 N.E. 102, 103 (Mass. 1912) (“The practice has prevailed for
many years in this court of awarding a new trial upon a single point where the error committed
in the trial court was of a kind which could be readily separated from the general issues, and
applied without injustice to one matter.”); In re Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.E. 846, 848 (Mass.
1911) (stating that a proposed statute allowing courts to limit new trial to the question of dam-
ages alone “is in accordance with the general practice to grant a new trial upon the question of
damages only, if the verdict is satisfactory in all particulars as a determination of the liability”);
Winn v. Columbian Ins. Co., 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 279, 293 (1831) (ordering a new trial for the
purposes of assessing damages only).
78 See, e.g., Walker v. Blassingame, 17 Ala. 810, 813–14 (1850); Woodward v. Horst, 10
Iowa 120, 123 (1859); Simmons, 97 N.E. at 105 n.1 (citing cases from other states); Lisbon v.
Lyman, 49 N.H. 553, 582–605 (1870); Laney v. Bradford, 38 S.C.L. (4 Rich.) 1, 3 (1850).  In the
early twentieth century, as docket pressure grew, the number of states allowing partial new trial
either by judicial decision or by statute grew significantly. See MILLAR, supra note 2, at 342–43.
79 See, e.g., Johnson v. McCulloch, 89 Ind. 270 (1883).
80 Bothwell v. Bos. Elevated Ry. Co., 102 N.E. 665, 668 (Mass. 1913).
81 M.D. CHALMERS, WILSON’S SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACTS, APPELLATE JURIS-
DICTION ACT, 1876, RULES OF COURT AND FORMS 353 (3d ed. 1882) (Order XXXIX, Rules 3 &
4).
82 Id. (Order XXXIX, Rule 3).  The full text of the rules reads:
3. A new trial shall not be granted on the ground of misdirection or of the improper
admission or rejection of evidence, unless in the opinion of the Court to which the
application is made some substantial wrong or miscarriage has been thereby occa-
sioned in the trial of the action; and if it appear to such Court that such wrong or
miscarriage affects part only of the matter in controversy, the Court may give final
judgment as to part thereof, and direct a new trial as to the other part only. . . .
4. A new trial may be ordered on any question in an action, whatever be the
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mentary on the Judicature Acts83 stated that these rules made signifi-
cant changes. Formerly, a misdirection of the judge or the improper
admission or rejection of evidence was grounds for a new trial as of
right, and the courts only had power to grant a new trial of the entire
action.84
In addition to their powers to limit retrial under the Judicature
Acts, English judges developed practices that furthered this goal.  In a
case in 1893, the judges of the Divisional Court showed a flexible atti-
tude to new trial.85  Although they thought that the judge below
should have left a question to the jury rather than deciding it himself,
because the parties wanted the matter decided without retrial and be-
cause the judge had reached the right conclusion, they did not order a
new trial.86  One of the judges commented:
There is a rule, which is adopted on motions for a new trial
and upon which we are going to act, that, when the cause has
been tried and the judges feel that they have all the facts
before them so that they are enabled to give a judgment that
will finally settle the matters in difference between the par-
ties, they are entitled to give such a judgment, although the
practice involves, I will not say usurpation by the judges, but
a partial transfer to them of the functions of the jury.87
Some American courts adopted a similar harmless error rule if a judge
erroneously took a case from a jury.88
grounds for the new trial, without interfering with the finding or decision upon any
other question.
Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Pearce v. Lansdowne, [1893] 62 Q.B. 441 (Eng.) (Williams, J.).
86 Id. at 443; see THAYER, supra note 50, at 239–41.
87 Pearce v. Lansdowne, [1893] 69 L.T. 316, 318 (Q.B.) (Williams, J.).
88 See, e.g., In re Sharon’s Estate, 177 P. 283, 290 (Cal. 1918) (en banc) (holding that unless
an erroneous decision to direct a verdict has caused a “miscarriage of justice,” “the error must be
disregarded and the judgment cannot be set aside on account thereof”); see also Catlett v. St.
Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co., 21 S.W. 1062, 1063 (Ark. 1893) (“When a judgment is re-
versed in this court because of no evidence to sustain the verdict, and the cause appears to have
been fully developed, it has grown to be the practice since the act of April 14, 1891, to dismiss
the suit instead of remanding the cause for a new trial.  It is the duty of the courts to prevent
parties from being harassed by suit after it appears that the suit can be of no profit to the
plaintiff.”).
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II. DIRECTED VERDICT IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
American courts in the nineteenth century looked for ways to
avoid the problems of new trial, and a method they often turned to
was directed verdict (also known as “peremptory instruction”).  In the
first half of the nineteenth century, the procedure of directed verdict
was closely entwined with nonsuit and comment on the evidence.  Di-
rected verdict was an outgrowth of these powers.
Courts held that the power to direct a verdict was a necessary
result of the common law rule that the facts were for the jury, the law
for the judge.89  If a party had not made out a legally sufficient case,
the other party should prevail as a matter of law.  The line between
fact and law, however, was highly malleable, and the trend through
the nineteenth century was to turn questions that had been considered
issues of fact for the jury into issues of law for the judge.90  For in-
stance, the question of sufficiency of the evidence became a question
of law for the judge to decide.91
Different jurisdictions took somewhat different paths toward per-
emptory instructions.  Many states followed an English model of di-
recting a verdict, based on the courts’ powers to instruct on the law
and comment on evidence.  Some states that restricted comment on
the evidence and did not allow compulsory nonsuit developed a differ-
ent procedure, known as the instruction “as in case of a nonsuit.”
A. The English Model: An Outgrowth of the Power to Instruct on
the Law and Comment on Evidence
Although jury control strengthened greatly in the second half of
the nineteenth century, it was far from absent in the early years of the
United States.  In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
the federal courts and courts in many states adopted procedures simi-
lar to English courts, in which a judge would “direct a verdict” for
plaintiff or defendant as an outgrowth of the judge’s power to instruct
on the law and comment on the evidence.  Examples of judges “di-
recting a verdict” in this way exist in some of the earliest printed re-
ports for American states,92 and the practice undoubtedly existed
before.
89 See, e.g., People v. Cook, 8 N.Y. 67, 67–68 (1853).
90 LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 69, at 448–50.
91 Lettow, supra note 28, at 542–47.
92 See, e.g., Polk’s Lessee v. Minner, 1 Del. Cas. 59, 61 (1795); Danforth v. Sargeant, 14
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For example, in a 1780 case before the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, the defendants had rented the plaintiff’s premises for a
year, and stayed beyond the term of the lease.93  The plaintiff warned
the defendants to get out, but the defendants insisted they had a right
to stay until ejected by law.94  The plaintiff sued defendants for tres-
pass.95  The court held the defense to be “frivolous,” and “directed a
verdict for the plaintiff.”96
In this procedure, a trial court actually instructed the jury to bring
in a particular verdict, and then submitted the case to them.97  Often, a
judge would put the direction in the form of a condition, such as “if
the evidence is believed by the jury to be true, the plaintiff is not enti-
tled to recover.”98  The jury then was supposed to bring in the verdict
as directed.99  The clerk recorded this verdict, and the court then en-
tered judgment accordingly.  This procedure therefore retained the
form of a jury verdict, although the decision was in substance the
judge’s.100  Keeping the form of a jury verdict was important to as-
suage concerns about judicial power.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, if the jury gave a ver-
dict against the judge’s direction, the remedy was a new trial.101  This
was the same as the practice in England.102  Cases in which a jury
found against a judge’s peremptory instruction seem to have been ex-
tremely rare.103  In the late nineteenth century, the remedy for a recal-
Mass. 491, 491 (1780); Dennis v. Farr, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 245, 245 (1803); Baughman v. Divler, 3
Yeates 9, 10 (Pa. 1800).
93 Danforth, 14 Mass. at 491.
94 Id.
95 See id.
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 366 (1850).
98 See, e.g., id. at 372–73.
99 See, e.g., id. at 371–72.
100 Because the result of the directed verdict was formally a jury verdict throughout the
nineteenth century, it can be difficult or impossible to determine from the minutes of courts or
docket books whether a directed verdict occurred in a case.  These records typically indicate
“jury verdict for plaintiff, $500 damages,” or “jury verdict for defendant,” without indicating
whether the court directed a verdict.  The only way to determine whether a directed verdict
occurred would be to examine an individual case file in which there had been a jury verdict. See,
e.g., Law Docket Books of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (1863–1938), National
Archives and Records Administration, Wash., D.C., RG 21, Entry 51; Minutes of the General
Terms of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (1863–1938), National Archives and
Records Administration, Wash., D.C., RG 21, Entry 53.
101 See Polk’s Lessee v. Minner, 1 Del. Cas. 59, 61 (1795).
102 See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
103 A Delaware case in 1795 is the only case I have seen in the first half of the nineteenth
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citrant jury began to change, and a new trial was no longer required.
This development is discussed in Part III.D.3.
Trial judges regularly directed verdicts if they were uncertain
about the applicable law.  In this circumstance, a trial judge would
make the verdict subject to the full court’s opinion on the law.104  This
practice was almost identical to the English case reserved.105
B. Directed Verdicts for Plaintiffs and for Defendants: The
Growing Importance of Clarity and Finality in
Commercial Cases
The vast majority of the directed verdicts before the 1810s were
in favor of the plaintiff.106  It was usually not necessary to direct a
verdict for the defendant because the plaintiff would agree to a non-
suit (or, in some states, could be nonsuited without his consent).107
Ordinarily, a nonsuit was not a final judgment on the merits and left
the plaintiff free to bring another action.108  Because of this lack of
finality, in a number of states, plaintiffs could not appeal a nonsuit in
many circumstances.109
In the late 1810s, the number of reported directed verdicts in
favor of the defendant began to grow.110  This change may have oc-
curred because trial courts wanted to encourage finality by giving de-
fendants a verdict, rather than subjecting them to further possible
litigation after a nonsuit.  Also, the switch to directed verdict for de-
fendant from nonsuit allowed more plaintiffs to appeal, and therefore
better enabled courts to clarify the law, and to provide predictability.
Finality and clarity of law were particularly important to courts in
commercial cases in the early nineteenth century.111
century in which a jury refused to follow a judge’s peremptory instruction. See Polk’s Lessee, 1
Del. Cas. at 61.
104 See, e.g., Weaver v. Bentley, 1 Cai. 47, 47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803); Kiddie v. Debrutz, 2 N.C.
(1 Hayw.) 420, 422 (1796).
105 See supra Part I.A.
106 See, e.g., Polk’s Lessee, 1 Del. Cas. at 61; Danforth v. Sargeant, 14 Mass. 491, 491 (1780);
Dennis v. Farr, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 245, 245 (1803); Baughman v. Divler, 3 Yeates 9, 10 (Pa. 1800).
107 MILLAR, supra note 2, at 303.
108 Id. at 305.
109 See, e.g., Union Bank v. Carr, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 345, 346 (1841).  This rule was miti-
gated, however, by allowing a nonsuited plaintiff to appeal if costs were awarded against him.
Also, often a plaintiff who had been nonsuited involuntarily could appeal.
110 See, e.g., King v. President of Dedham Bank, 15 Mass. (1 Tyng) 447, 453 (1819); Skinner
v. Skinner, 7 N.C. (3 Mur.) 535, 536–38 (1819); Catlin v. Chittenden & Co., Brayt. 163, 164 (Vt.
1819).
111 See LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 69, at 499; Lettow, supra note 28, at 546.
The desire for clarity of law, particularly in commercial cases, also helped prompt the switch in
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Not only did directed verdicts further finality and help clarify the
law, but they also made the results of adjudication more predictable in
commercial cases by avoiding unfettered jury decisions.  Juror biases
could unsettle application of the law, particularly in insurance and
banking cases.  Juries in the early nineteenth century were apt to find
against defendant insurance companies or banks which had denied
payment on claims, regardless of the law or evidence.112  The growing
commercial activity of the new republic seems to have encouraged the
practice of directed verdict for the defendant.
For example, in a case in 1819 before the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, plaintiff, as the bearer of a bill, claimed the right to
demand payment directly from the defendants, officers of a recently
incorporated bank, without first demanding payment from anyone
else.113  The bill, however, was a draft on a third person, with an im-
plied promise that the defendants would pay in case of default.114  The
full court approved the trial court’s direction of a verdict for the de-
fendants.115  The court was eager to correct “[t]he mistake of the
plaintiff, and perhaps of others who received bills of this description,
[which] seems to have arisen from the belief that, when a bank was
incorporated, all their bills and notes, of whatever tenor, were to pass
as money, and were redeemable by the bank at the pleasure of the
holder.”116  Many more banks were being incorporated in the late
1810s,117 and this kind of clarity was important to foster growing com-
mercial activity.  The court may have felt particular urgency in clarify-
ing the law because of the financial panic of 1819.118
New England states in the early nineteenth century from a panel of judges presiding at trial to a
single judge.  A single judge could give clearer and more authoritative instructions to the jury
than a panel.  This switch is evident between a 1780 Massachusetts case, in which a panel pre-
sided over the trial (and all of them approved the directed verdict), and an 1819 case, in which a
single judge presided at trial and the full court reviewed the trial judge’s actions. Compare Dan-
forth, 14 Mass. at 491, with King, 15 Mass. (1 Tyng) at 447.
112 Lettow, supra note 28, at 546.
113 King, 15 Mass. (1 Tyng) at 453.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 J. VAN FENSTERMAKER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN COMMERCIAL BANKING:
1782–1837, at 183 (1965); J. Van Fenstermaker, The Statistics of American Commercial Banking,
1782–1818, 25 J. ECON. HIST. 400, 400–01 (1965).  This great expansion of banks, and money
supply, led to the Panic of 1819. MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE PANIC OF 1819: REACTIONS AND
POLICIES 6–10 (1962).
118 See ROTHBARD, supra note 117, at 6–10.
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C. Directed Verdict vs. Judicial Comment on Evidence
In the early period, it could be difficult to distinguish the practice
of judicial comment on evidence from a directed verdict.  Courts,
however, generally made a distinction between a strong comment, or
a suggestion to a jury in favor of a party, and what they called a di-
rected verdict or peremptory instruction.119  In 1828, the U.S. Supreme
Court considered the propriety of a trial judge’s charge that the plain-
tiffs were not entitled to recover, and that the jury’s verdict “ought to
be for the defendants.”120  In his opinion for the Court, Justice Story
rejected counsel’s suggestion that the instruction was advisory to the
jury, part of the judge’s power to comment on evidence.121  Story de-
clared: “We do not, however, understand that the present instruction
was in fact, or was intended to be, merely in the nature of advice to
the jury.  It is couched in the most absolute terms, and imposed an
obligation upon the jury to find a verdict for the defendants.”122  The
Court proceeded to hold that the trial court erred in not leaving cer-
tain questions to the jury, as the questions turned on disputed issues of
fact.123
Comment on the evidence could be difficult for appellate judges
to limit, as it could be so various in content and effect, but a decision
to direct a verdict was more definite and could be reviewed more eas-
ily.  Stephen Yeazell has pointed to both new trial and directed verdict
as important devices for appellate courts to gain control of results at
trial.124  The trial courts applied the procedures, but appellate courts
carefully monitored the application.125
D. The Standard for Directing a Verdict: The Scintilla Rule
In order to direct a verdict, nearly all courts in the first half of the
nineteenth century held that the evidence had to be uncontradicted.
Even the slightest evidence on the other side would not permit a di-
119 See, e.g., Loehner v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Mo. 628, 631 (1854).  New York courts,
however, sometimes did not clearly distinguish between a directed verdict or a peremptory in-
struction and advice to the jury. See, e.g., People v. Cook, 8 N.Y. 67, 76 (1853).
120 McLanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 170, 182 (1828).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 191.
124 Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994
WIS. L. REV. 631, 644.
125 Id. (“The capture of trials by appellate courts gave them almost plenary power, not just
over the law applied by trial courts, but over the results reached in individual cases.”); see also
LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 380 (1930).
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rected verdict.126  In the second half of the nineteenth century, this
standard became known, rather disparagingly, as the “scintilla rule.”127
Many state courts agreed with the rule in federal courts that giving a
peremptory instruction required the same standard as a demurrer.  In
Parks v. Ross,128 in 1850, the U.S. Supreme Court approved of the trial
court’s “imperative” instruction to the jury to find for the defendant
because the case met the standard of a demurrer to evidence.129  “It
answers the same purpose, and should be tested by the same rules.”130
(Directed verdict replaced demurrer because a motion for directed
verdict, unlike a demurrer, allowed the moving party to introduce evi-
dence and generally to continue to litigate if the motion was de-
feated.)  The Court explained: “A demurrer to evidence admits not
only the facts stated therein, but also every conclusion which a jury
might fairly or reasonably infer therefrom.”131  A notable exception to
this strict standard for the use of directed verdict in the first half of the
nineteenth century was New York, discussed in Part III.A.2.
E. Frequency of Directed Verdict: The Role of Commercial
Development, Judicial Power, and the Field Code
The number of reported cases involving directed verdict in many
states grew steadily in the first few decades of the new nation, and
more rapidly beginning in the late 1820s.  Compared with other states,
three states produced very large numbers of reported directed verdict
cases: New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts.132  Not coinciden-
126 See, e.g., Greenleaf v. Birth, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 292, 299 (1835) (“Where there is no evi-
dence tending to prove a particular fact, the court [sic] are bound so to instruct the jury, when
requested.”).
127 See, e.g., Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1871); Toomey v.
London, Brighton & S. Coast Ry. Co., (1857) 140 Eng. Rep. 694 (C.P.) 696.
128 Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362 (1850).
129 Id. at 372–73 (describing the trial court’s instruction to the jury at the close of plaintiff’s
evidence as “that, if the evidence is believed by the jury to be true, the plaintiff is not entitled to
recover.”).
130 Id. at 373.
131 Id.
132 Nearly all of the New England states produced substantial numbers of directed verdict
cases.  The New England states were highly commercial compared with other regions and their
judges had strong powers to comment on evidence.  Lerner, supra note 68, at 253.  Massachu-
setts courts seem almost entirely to have ignored an 1808 statute providing that civil juries were
to “decide at their discretion, by a general verdict, both the fact and the law, involved in the
issue.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 139, § 15 (1808).  Edith Henderson discusses the possible origin of
this statute. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 304.
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tally, these states all contained major commercial centers, and their
judges retained strong powers to comment on evidence.133
In directing so many verdicts, New York judges serenely disre-
garded the apparent intent of the Field Code, the landmark codifica-
tion of civil procedure drafted by a commission headed by David
Dudley Field and enacted by the New York legislature in 1848.134  The
Field Code was hostile to judicial control of jury verdicts.135  One
scholar has remarked: “The commissioners spoke of the jury as one of
‘[o]ur most valued institutions’ and seemed to mean it.”136  The Field
Code did not provide for directed verdict,137 thus suggesting that
judges lacked the power to use the procedure.  (The legislature, how-
ever, amended the New York Code in 1852 to give judges limited
power to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict,138 a provision
that was the first or among the first of its kind.)
The Field Code’s lack of a provision on directed verdict seems
not to have dimmed in the slightest New York judges’ enthusiasm for
the procedure.  New York courts completely ignored the Field Code in
their discussions of directed verdicts.  In an 1853 case, the New York
Court of Appeals laid out a comprehensive catalogue of a trial judge’s
powers to take a civil case from a jury (including demurrer, nonsuit,
and directed verdict), together with the appropriate standards for the
procedures.139  In this extended discussion, the court did not once
mention the new Code, except as it authorized a convention of judges
to decide on the number of counsel permitted to be heard.140  The
court declared: “Verdicts to an immense amount are daily taken,
under the direction of the presiding judge, in cases where the defence
133 Lerner, supra note 68, at 253.  In what was said to be a piece of legislative subterfuge,
representative Benjamin Butler seems to have slipped into a bill about another subject a restric-
tion on Massachusetts judges commenting on evidence; the bill passed the Massachusetts legisla-
ture in 1854. Id. at 256–57.  The traditions of judicial control in Massachusetts were so strong,
however, that it is doubtful how much effect the restriction had.
134 FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 391.
135 For example, the Field Code provided that the jury rather than the judge was to decide
whether it would give a general or special verdict.  1848 N.Y. Laws 537, §§ 215–216.
136 Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 937 (1987) (quoting THE FIRST
REPORT OF THE (NEW YORK) COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING 139 (1848)).
137 See 1848 N.Y. Laws 537–38.
138 See Robert Wyness Millar, The Old Re´gime and the New in Civil Procedure, 14 N.Y.U.
L.Q. REV. 197, 210–11 (1936–1937); Young B. Smith, The Power of the Judge to Direct a Verdict:
Section 457-a of The New York Civil Practice Act, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 121–22 (1924).
139 People v. Cook, 8 N.Y. 67, 70 (1853) (civil case, “in the nature of a quo warranto”).
140 Id. at 76.
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[sic.] has wholly failed.”141  Many of these were actions to collect a
debt.  The New York Reports also contain significant numbers of di-
rected verdicts for defendants, even with that state’s powerful compul-
sory nonsuit procedure.142  Thus, in states with a strong judicial culture
of jury control, even comprehensive codes failed to have an effect, at
least without an outright prohibition of a procedure.  This illustration
suggests some of the limitations of codification generally; legal culture
plays a large role in shaping procedure, regardless of the positive law.
In contrast with New York, states that greatly restricted judicial
comment on the evidence and that had less sophisticated commercial
activity tended to produce far fewer reported cases of directed ver-
dicts.  The procedure appeared to be much less common in those
states.  Tennessee, for example, had early restricted judicial comment
on the evidence.143  Although Tennessee’s Supreme Court of Errors
and Appeals approved the practice of directed verdict in 1831, at least
in theory,144 the procedure seems to have been very rarely used
there.145  (A Tennessee court in 1852 did direct a verdict in favor of a
defendant who appeared to have been joined for the sole purpose of
preventing his testimony against the plaintiff, because of the rule of
party disqualification for interest.146  Directing the verdict allowed
that defendant to testify as a witness for the other defendants.)  Begin-
ning in the late 1870s, Tennessee courts addressed the question of di-
rected verdict more often in reported cases, as railroads, which were
defendants in increasing numbers of cases, often requested directed
verdicts.147  In 1896, the Tennessee Supreme Court declared that di-
rected verdict was not part of the state’s practice.148
F. Instructing the Jury “As in Case of a Nonsuit”
A procedure similar to the directed verdict began in Kentucky
and spread to a number of other states and the federal courts in those
states: instructing the jury “as in case of a nonsuit.”  Courts tended to
141 Id. at 75.
142 Restricting by date, I performed the following search in Westlaw’s New York Cases
(NY-CS) database: “direct! /s verdict.”
143 See Lerner, supra note 68, at 246.
144 Houston’s Lessee v. Pillow & Thomas, 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 481, 488 (1831).
145 See, e.g., Hopkins v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co., 34 S.W. 1029, 1038
(Tenn. 1896) (discussing the court’s observation that it had not noticed a widespread practice of
directing verdicts in the state).
146 Beasley v. Bradley, 32 Tenn. (2 Swan) 180, 182 (1852).  For similar cases in other states,
see Blume, supra note 2, at 566–67.
147 See, e.g., Robinson v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 70 Tenn. 594, 596–97 (1879).
148 Hopkins, 34 S.W. at 1038.
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adopt this procedure in states that restricted comment on evidence
and that did not allow compulsory nonsuit.149  Kentucky, like some
other states and the federal courts, did not allow a compulsory non-
suit.150  A plaintiff had to agree before a case could be dismissed for
failure of proof, without going to a jury.151  If a plaintiff did not agree,
the case would go to a jury even though a judge had determined the
proof was inadequate at law.152  This problem was compounded be-
cause Kentucky judges, like judges in Virginia, from which many Ken-
tuckians came, were reluctant to comment on the evidence.153
The solution Kentucky courts adopted was the instruction to the
jury “as in case of a nonsuit.”  In this procedure, the defendant moved
for the instruction at the close of plaintiff’s evidence.154  In the timing
of the motion, the procedure resembled the nonsuit.  (As described
below, this timing later proved to be highly significant.)  If the judge
granted the motion, he told the jury that they must find a verdict for
defendant.155  Unlike a nonsuit, this was a final decision on the merits
and subject to appeal.  The standard for giving an instruction “as in
case of a nonsuit” was the same as for a nonsuit: “[T]he Court must
not only consider the evidence given [by the plaintiff] as true, but are
bound to infer from it every fact which the jury might fairly and ra-
tionally have inferred.”156
A Kentucky case from 1811 provides an example of the proce-
dure.  In the pleadings, the plaintiff claimed that defendants accepted
a bill to pay the plaintiff an amount stated at a particular time.157  At
trial, the plaintiff introduced evidence that the defendants refused to
accept the bill as written, but agreed to pay the amount “as it was
convenient.”158  Defendants at the close of plaintiff’s evidence moved
149 States that both restricted judicial comment on evidence and adopted the procedure
allowing the judge to instruct the jury in the case of a nonsuit include: Alabama, Ohio, Illinois,
Arkansas, Mississippi. See Lerner, supra note 68, at 222; infra notes 163–68.  States that did not
allow compulsory nonsuits yet allowed the judge to instruct the jury in the case of a nonsuit
include: Alabama and Arkansas. See Smith v. Seaton, Minor 75 (Ala. 1822); Ringo v. Field, 6
Ark. 43, 44 (1845).
150 See, e.g., Elmore v. Grymes, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 469, 471–72 (1828); Reed v. Bragg, 28 Ky.
(5 J.J. Marsh.) 620, 620 (1831).
151 See Henderson, supra note 2, at 300.
152 See id.
153 See, e.g., Hurt v. Miller, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 336, 337 (1821).
154 See, e.g., Gray v. Craig, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 312, 313 (1811).
155 See, e.g., id.
156 Gallatin v. Bradford, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 209, 209 (1808) (explaining the standard for di-
recting a jury as in case of a nonsuit in terms of the standard for nonsuit).
157 Gray, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) at 312.
158 Id. at 313.
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for an instruction to the jury “as in case of a nonsuit,” because there
was “a fatal variance between the allegations and proofs.”159  The trial
court gave the instruction, the jury gave a verdict for the defendants,
and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the instruction as being
“clearly supported.”160
The first reference to this procedure occurs in some of the earliest
Kentucky reports, in several cases in 1808, and is discussed there as if
it is well-established.161  Thereafter the Kentucky reports contain an
average of several cases a year concerning the procedure through the
mid-1870s;162 the procedure seems to have been popular with judges
and defendants up to that time.
Courts in several other states and an occasional federal court fol-
lowed Kentucky in instructing “as in case of a nonsuit.”  The first
mention in the reports of the procedure outside Kentucky occurred in
Alabama in 1821; the procedure appears in that case to be well-estab-
lished.163  Other states followed in the mid-1820s, with each having
such cases in its first published reports: Mississippi (1824),164 Ohio
(1824),165 and Illinois (1825).166  The federal circuit court of Ohio took
up the practice, and the U.S. Supreme Court duly reviewed its deci-
sion applying the procedure without special remark in 1829.167  The
Supreme Court of Indiana explicitly rejected the procedure in 1833,168
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See Hume v. Arrasmith, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 165, 166 (1808); see also Gallatin, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb)
at 209; Hubbard v. Prather, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 178, 180–81 (1808). Bibb’s Reports was compiled by
Judge Bibb, who wrote the opinions in the first two of these cases.
162 I performed the following search in Westlaw’s Kentucky Cases (KY-CS) database: “‘as
in’ /2 case /4 nonsuit.”  That search yields 142 Kentucky cases, of which 116 were decided before
1875, 14 between 1875 and 1895, and 12 after 1895.
163 Cabiness v. Brown, Minor 41, 41 (Ala. 1821).
164 McFarland v. Smith, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 172, 173–74 (1824).
165 Courcier v. Graham, 1 Ohio 330, 345, 347 (1824).
166 Cornelius v. Wash, 1 Ill. (Breese) 98, 100 (1825).
167 Bank of U.S. v. Carneal, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 543, 551 (1829) (“The [defendant] having asked
the court below to instruct the jury as in case of a non-suit; and the court having acceded to his
request, that instruction can be maintained only upon the supposition that there was no contrari-
ety of evidence as to the facts which ought to have been left to the jury; and consequently, every
inference fairly deducible from the facts which afforded a presumption of due notice, ought to be
made in favour of the plaintiffs.”) (holding that the court below erred in giving the instruction
because there was conflicting evidence).
168 State v. Beem, 3 Blackf. 222, 223 (Ind. 1833) (“We cannot pass by this part of the case,
without noticing the extraordinary nature of the instructions to the jury asked for by the defen-
dant.  The Court was asked to instruct the jury as in case of a non-suit.  There is no such verdict
known to the law as that here referred to.  The Court is authorized by statute in certain cases, to
give a judgment as in case of a non-suit; but a jury can not, in any case, find a verdict to that
effect.  The Court must be always right in refusing to instruct the jury to find such a verdict.”).
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but other courts allowed it: Arkansas (1840)169 and the Wisconsin Ter-
ritory (1843).170
The states that adopted the procedure of instructing the jury as in
case of a nonsuit either had from the beginning or developed substan-
tial restrictions or prohibitions on trial judges commenting on evi-
dence to the jury.  In 1841, the High Court of Errors and Appeals of
Mississippi faced a challenge to the procedure as violating a statute
prohibiting judicial comment on evidence.  Chief Justice William
Sharkey acknowledged the state’s prohibition on judicial comment on
evidence.171  “But at the same time,” he wrote, “it must be the prerog-
ative of the court to determine whether the evidence conduces to
prove the issue . . . .”172  The question whether the evidence tended to
prove the issue was a matter of law for the court.173
Instructing the jury as in case of a nonsuit proved successful for a
time with courts and defendants in some states, possibly because it
seemed merely an extension of the well-known procedure of nonsuit,
not an invasion of the province of the jury or a disapproved comment
on evidence, as directed verdict might have seemed.  It had the advan-
tage over the nonsuit of providing finality to the defendant, if success-
ful.  (It could not operate in favor of plaintiffs.)  With the growth of
personal injury litigation against railroads, however, the procedure fell
out of favor.  Part III.B. discusses its decline in the late nineteenth
century and its replacement with directed verdict.
III. CHANGES IN DIRECTED VERDICT PROCEDURE IN THE SECOND
HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Many significant changes occurred in directed verdict procedure
in the second half of the nineteenth century.  The numbers of reported
directed verdicts increased dramatically; in many of these cases, trial
judges directed verdicts for defendant railroads.  A difference contrib-
uting to the larger number of reported directed verdicts was a change
in the standard in the federal courts and most states.  As described in
Part III.A.2, the first jurisdiction to adopt the new standard was New
York in the late 1820s.  Following the lead of English courts, federal
and state courts abandoned the scintilla rule, and courts began to di-
rect verdicts if a contrary verdict given by a jury would be set aside as
169 Palmer v. Ashley, 3 Ark. 75, 83 (1840).
170 Stevens v. Coon, 1 Pin. 356, 357–59 (Wis. 1843).
171 Perry v. Clarke, 6 Miss. (5 Howard) 495, 501 (1841).
172 Id. at 499.
173 Id.
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against evidence.  In England and in the federal courts, this change in
the standard for directed verdict closely followed the abolition of dis-
qualification of witnesses for interest.  Growing distrust of juries in
England and America, especially in cases involving railroads, en-
couraged this change in the standard for directing verdicts.  Greater
numbers of complicated personal injury cases increased docket pres-
sure for many courts, and intensified the search for an efficient alter-
native to new trial.
Substantive tort doctrines such as contributory negligence and
the fellow servant rule facilitated direction of verdicts.  The growing
unpopularity of railroads led to attacks on these doctrines and on di-
rected verdict itself.  At the end of the nineteenth century and into the
early twentieth, courts were increasingly willing to dispense with a di-
rection to a jury entirely.  Any pretense that the jury was involved was
eliminated, and judicial power was exercised openly.
It is important to keep in mind the political pressures on Ameri-
can judges during this period.  After the 1850s, judges in most states
were elected.174  Appointed judges, such as the federal judges, could
certainly have political biases and ongoing political pressure from the
desire to maintain standing in a community and other reasons.
Elected judges faced more intense pressure, because of the need to
stand for reelection, from political parties, interests, and the bar.175
Railroads and the populist hostility they inspired, in particular,
were potent sources of political pressure in the late nineteenth cen-
tury.  Railroads were known to buy the votes of state legislators in
certain instances, and otherwise could exercise great control over state
legislatures.176  Anti-railroad populist movements also influenced leg-
islatures.177  Railroads, through the extensive networks of lawyers they
174 Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective
Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 207–09 (1993).
175 See, e.g., LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 69, at 506–09; Rene´e L. Lerner,
From Popular Control to Independence: Reform of the Elected Judiciary in Boss Tweed’s New
York, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 109, 118–19, 134–38 (2007); Jed H. Shugerman, The Twist of
Long Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1349,
1366–67 (2010).
176 See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 1–4, 10–13, 19–41
(2001); LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 69, at 1063–64; GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND
CONFLICTS: THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, 1870–1970, at 3–15 (1970); Charles F. Adams, Jr., A Chapter of Erie and An Erie Raid, in
HIGH FINANCE IN THE SIXTIES: CHAPTERS FROM THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE ERIE RAILWAY
63–67, 70–72, 74 (Frederick C. Hicks ed., 1929).
177 See ELY, JR., supra note 176, at 80–93; DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE
OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865–1925, at 345
(1987); ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN
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employed in all parts of the country, had influence with the bar.178
Beginning in the 1880s, a specialized plaintiffs’ bar arose, dedicated to
litigation against railroads and financed by contingency fees.179  Judges
in many locales depended on the support of influential politicians,
some of whom were also members of the bar, for renomination and
reelection.180  These sorts of pressure could not but affect to some ex-
tent legal doctrine and particular rulings.
A. Changes in the Standard for Nonsuit and Directed Verdict: The
Influence of Railroads
Over the course of the nineteenth century, many jurisdictions
abandoned the scintilla rule and allowed a trial judge to direct a ver-
dict if a contrary verdict would be set aside for insufficient evidence
and new trial granted.  By the beginning of the twentieth century, a
large majority of courts had announced this standard.181
Critics argued that this standard was incorrect, at least theoreti-
cally.  Setting aside a verdict for insufficient evidence and ordering a
new trial allowed the issue to be decided by another jury, thus pre-
serving jury power.  A judge directing a verdict, however, resulted in
final judgment entered for the moving party and removed any signifi-
cant role for the jury.182
STATE, 1877–1917, at 46–47 (1999); Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation
During the Progressive Era: A Reevaluation, 72 J. AM. HIST. 63, 84 (1985).
178 LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 69, at 1021–25.  A railroad typically had re-
tainer contracts with many lawyers that prohibited the lawyer from representing a client in any
case against the railroad, and even in any case against any railroad.  Railroads sometimes tried to
use these retainer contracts to monopolize legal talent in a locale, not always successfully.
179 Id. at 1024–25, 1054–56; WILLIAM G. THOMAS, LAWYERING FOR THE RAILROAD: BUSI-
NESS, LAW, AND POWER IN THE NEW SOUTH 45 (1999).
180 LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 69, at 506; Lerner, supra note 175, at 134–38.
181 One commentator claimed that this was the standard “[i]n almost every jurisdiction.”
Note, Limitations on Power of Court to Direct Verdict, 16 HARV. L. REV. 515, 515 (1903).  This
claim seems to have been exaggerated, but the number of states adopting this standard was
large. See 26 RULING CASE LAW 1068 (William M. McKinney & Burdet A. Rich eds., 1929);
WIGMORE, supra note 2, at 296–99.
182 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 22, 29 (1856) (“If [a litigant’s]
verdict be set aside, he will have another opportunity, upon another trial, or [sic] strengthening
his case by additional testimony.  Whereas, if he be cut off by a peremptory instruction to find
against him there is an end of the case, and he will enjoy no further opportunity of strengthening
his proof.”); McDonald v. Metro. St. Ry. Co., 60 N.E. 282, 283 (N.Y. 1901) (“The result of setting
aside a verdict and the result of directing one are widely different, and should not be controlled
by the same conditions or circumstances.  In one case there is a retrial; in the other the judgment
is final.”); 9 WIGMORE, supra note 2, at 299; Note, Directed Verdict Under the New York Civil
Practice Act, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 256, 258–59 (1922); Note, supra note 181, at 515.
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1. Abolition of Disqualification for Interest
A change in the law of evidence in the mid-nineteenth century
led to more conflicting testimony in trials, indeed made possible many
negligence actions, and may have encouraged judges to abandon the
scintilla standard for directed verdict.183
In the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth in English and
American courts, witnesses who were deemed to be interested in the
outcome of the litigation were disqualified from testifying.184  The os-
tensible rationale was fear of perjury.185  Disqualification for interest
included the parties themselves.  As John Langbein has observed, dis-
qualification of the parties in a tort case typically prevented testimony
from the victim and injurer, which was often indispensable to prove
the case.186  It is not surprising that while the rule of disqualification
for interest prevailed, few negligence cases were brought, and the law
of torts remained largely undeveloped.187
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, England and American
jurisdictions abolished this crippling rule.188  Parliament abolished dis-
qualification of civil parties for interest in 1851,189 a date that closely
preceded English courts’ rejection of the scintilla standard for nonsuit
in the 1850s.190  Michigan was the first state to allow all nonparty inter-
ested witnesses to testify, in 1846, and Connecticut was the first state
to allow interested parties to testify, in 1848.191  Northern states fol-
lowed rapidly in the 1850s, Southern states after the Civil War, and by
1881, all states allowed parties to testify in civil cases.192  Congress al-
lowed civil parties in federal court to testify in 1864.193  As explained
below, the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned the scintilla rule for di-
183 I am indebted to John Leubsdorf for suggesting this connection.
184 John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View From the
Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1174, 1179, 1184–86 (1996).
185 See id. at 1184.
186 Id. at 1179; see also NELSON, supra note 4, at 24–25, 156.
187 WITT, supra note 22, at 56–57; Langbein, supra note 184, at 1179.
188 For explanations of the abolition of disqualification for interest in civil cases, see Joel N.
Bodansky, The Abolition of the Party-Witness Disqualification: An Historical Survey, 70 KY. L.J.
91, 94 (1981–1982); George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise As Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 659–62,
669–74 (1997).
189 An Act to Amend the Law of Evidence, 1851, 14 & 15 Vict., c. 99 (Eng.).
190 See infra Part III.A.3.
191 Bodansky, supra note 188, at 93; Fisher, supra note 188, at 659.
192 Fisher, supra note 188, at 669.
193 Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 210, § 3, 13 Stat. 344, 351 (1864) (“Provided, That in the courts of
the United States there shall be no exclusion of any witness on account of color, nor in civil
actions because he is a party to, or interested in, the issue tried.”) (attached to a provision appro-
priating money for detection and prosecution of counterfeiting).
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rected verdict soon afterward, in 1871.194  In nearly all jurisdictions,
the abolition of disqualification for interest occurred by statute,195 not
by judicial decision.
The rule of disqualification for interest had prevented many neg-
ligence cases from going to a jury, or being brought at all.  With the
rule’s abolition, more cases of negligence were brought, and many
presented conflicting testimony.  Deciding which witnesses to credit
was traditionally a task for the jury.196  This was one reason why the
common law in the eighteenth century showed so great a preference
for written evidence;197 written evidence (such as a contract or a deed)
permitted greater judicial decisionmaking.198  Because of doubts about
jury competence, the law of evidence—including disqualification for
interest—had been used for jury avoidance.199
The abolition of disqualification for interest released a flood of
oral testimony, and therefore, potentially, of jury decisionmaking.
Doubts about the jury’s competence and impartiality had not disap-
peared, however; indeed, they were growing.200  In this new procedu-
ral world, English and many American judges were reluctant to sit by
and let a jury credit witnesses whose testimony the judge thought was
incredible, or draw an inference of negligence the judge thought was
unjustified.  The judges gave themselves more latitude to nonsuit or to
give a binding instruction to a jury in cases of conflicting testimony, or
weak evidence of negligence.  In effect, the new standard for directed
verdict substituted for the old disqualification for interest as a method
of jury control or avoidance.201  To be sure, old jury control devices
were abolished, but new ones took their place.  A great advantage of
the new devices over the old, however, was that, by allowing party
testimony, more injured parties could sue for negligence.
194 See infra Part III.A.5.
195 Fisher, supra note 188, at 659.
196 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 49–55 (discussing reluctance of English judges
to sustain a demurrer to the evidence in cases involving oral testimony).
197 Langbein, supra note 184, at 1185.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 49–55.
199 See Fisher, supra note 188, at 657–58.
200 See infra Part III.A.3–4.
201 This analysis qualifies George Fisher’s statement that the nineteenth-century legal sys-
tem “invested ever greater confidence in the jury’s capacity to resolve factual disputes.”  Fisher,
supra note 188, at 661.  Fisher remarked on the continuing ambivalence of judges and lawyers
toward juries, id. at 698–701, but did not discuss the new mechanisms of jury control, probably
because of his emphasis on criminal cases.
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2. New York: Conflict Over Railroads
Beginning in the late 1820s, New York courts held that a trial
judge could take a case from a jury by nonsuit or peremptory instruc-
tion even if there was some contradictory evidence, as long as the
court would have ordered a new trial for verdict against evidence if
the jury had given the opposite verdict.202  As the standard for order-
ing a new trial for verdict against evidence itself changed over time to
permit judges increasingly to weigh contradictory evidence,203 this rule
allowed judges increasing power to take cases away from juries.  New
York at the time had a large amount of sophisticated commercial ac-
tivity compared with other states, and was one of the first states to
have an extensive network of railroads.204
New York courts justified taking cases from juries in part because
of jury bias against railroads.  In Haring v. New York & Erie Railroad
Co.,205 according to testimony for the plaintiff, plaintiff’s deceased
husband was driving a sleigh very fast on a highway across a railroad
track at a place where high embankments made it impossible to see
cars coming until one was on the tracks.206  Railroad cars struck the
202 See, e.g., Rich v. Rich, 16 Wend. 663, 676 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (“To warrant an unquali-
fied direction at the trial in favor of one or the other party, the evidence must either be undis-
puted, or there must be such a strong preponderance that should the jury find against it, a new
trial would be granted for that reason.”); Demyer v. Souzer, 6 Wend. 436, 438 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1831) (“[W]here the evidence in favor of the plaintiff’s right is so slight, and that which supports
the defence so strong, that had the jury found for the plaintiff the court would have felt itself
called on to set asid [sic] their verdict, it will not send the cause back to the jury because the
judge ordered a nonsuit.”); Stuart v. Simpson, 1 Wend. 376, 379 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828) (“But it is
said that slight circumstances are sufficient to go to the jury, and whether the defendant knew
the boys to be the plaintiff’s apprentices or not, was a question for the jury.  I agree that courts
should be extremely cautious, on the subject of interfering with the province of the jury; yet it is
matter of common practice to set aside verdicts as against evidence, and sometimes because they
are against the weight of evidence.  If, therefore, the evidence would not authorize a jury to find
a verdict for the plaintiff, or the court would set it aside if so found, as contrary to evidence, in
such cases it is the duty of the court to nonsuit the plaintiff.”) (upholding a nonsuit in a case in
which the plaintiff sued defendant for enticing his apprentices to work for him; plaintiff had to
prove defendant’s knowledge that the boys were the apprentices of plaintiff, a carpenter; the
evidence alleged by plaintiff was that the boys were young and appeared with mahogany dust on
their clothes).
203 See Lettow, supra note 28, at 542–46.
204 See Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151,
152 (1946) (“[B]y 1850 Albany and Buffalo were connected, and another line, the Erie, was
approaching Dunkirk on Lake Erie.  Thus New York became a fountainhead of American rail-
road law.”).
205 Haring v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 13 Barb. 9 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1852).
206 Id. at 14–15.  Plaintiff also introduced testimony that the railroad had failed to ring a
bell in running the cars, as required by law.  Conceding that the railroad might also have been
negligent, the trial court remarked, “the plaintiff must show that the act of the defendants was
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sleigh, throwing the driver out and causing injuries leading to his
death.207  At the close of plaintiff’s evidence, the defendant railroad
moved for a nonsuit on the ground of contributory negligence,208 a
rule by then well established in New York.209  After considerable de-
liberation and arguments from counsel, the trial judge granted the mo-
tion and nonsuited the plaintiff.210  The General Term of the Supreme
Court of New York County (composed of trial judges sitting together
as an appellate court) affirmed the nonsuit, holding that the deceased
was undoubtedly negligent.211  The court openly discussed jury biases
in cases against railroads:
[J]uries ordinarily find according to the direction or intima-
tion of the circuit judge, where there is a strong preponder-
ance of testimony.  But there are cases in which this
conformity of opinion may not exist.  We can not shut our
eyes to the fact that in certain controversies between the
weak and the strong—between a humble individual and a gi-
gantic corporation, the sympathies of the human mind natu-
rally, honestly and generously, run to the assistance and
support of the feeble, and apparently oppressed; and that
compassion will sometimes exercise over the deliberations of
a jury, an influence which, however honorable to them as
philanthropists, is wholly inconsistent with the principles of
law and the ends of justice.  There, is therefore, a manifest
propriety in withdrawing from the consideration of the jury,
those cases in which the plaintiff fails to show a right of
recovery.212
New York trial judges feared that even their considerable powers to
comment on evidence would not suffice to overcome jury bias in rail-
the sole cause of his injury; that it would not have happened if such cause had not existed.” Id.
at 11.
207 Id. at 9–10.
208 Id.
209 See, e.g., Rathbun v. Payne, 19 Wend. 399, 400–01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) (“[A] plaintiff
suing for negligence must be wholly without fault.”) (denying recovery because of contributory
negligence); Spencer v. Utica & Schenectady R.R. Co., 5 Barb. 337, 338–39 (N.Y. Gen. Term
1849) (“It was equally necessary for the plaintiff to establish the proposition that he himself was
without negligence and without fault.  This is a stern and unbending rule, which has been settled
by a long series of adjudged cases, which we cannot overrule if we would.”) (holding that plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent).  On the development of the contributory negligence rule in
New York, see generally Malone, supra note 204.
210 Haring, 13 Barb. at 10.
211 Id. at 15 (“A man who rushes headlong against a locomotive engine, without using the
ordinary means of discovering his danger, cannot be said to exercise ordinary care.”).
212 Id. at 15–16.
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road cases, and held that such cases should be taken from the jury
entirely.213
Two different opinions of the New York Court of Appeals in the
1860s in the same case illustrate differing views about the respective
role of judges and juries in cases against railroads.  In Ernst v. Hudson
River Railroad Co.,214 plaintiff was the widow of a man who drove his
sleigh on a highway across a railroad track when cars struck and killed
him.215  The railroad moved for a nonsuit on the ground of contribu-
tory negligence.216  At least four trials occurred in the case.217
At the second trial, the jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals reversed in an opinion in 1862.218  The plaintiff
argued that a question of negligence was always a question of fact that
should go to a jury.219  The Court of Appeals, per Judge E. Darwin
Smith, responded that questions of negligence should be subject to
judicial control just as any other issue.220  Judge Smith sharply con-
trasted the abilities of judges and jurors.  The value of jury trial
“chiefly depends upon the fact that the trials are had under the direc-
tion and supervision of educated and experienced judges, who have
213 See id.; see also Mackey v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 27 Barb. 528, 540–41 (N.Y. Gen. Term
1858) (Smith, J.) (“[T]he justice at the trial would have been warranted in nonsuiting the plain-
tiffs; and how the jury could say that the plaintiffs’ intestate was not guilty of negligence, or that
his negligence in no way contributed to his death, I cannot comprehend . . . . [The jury verdict for
plaintiffs was] directly against the evidence, and we cannot uphold it or refuse to set it aside,
unless we adopt the rule which is, I fear, quite prevalent in the jury box, that the same measure
of justice is not to be meted out to a rail road corporation that is meted out to natural persons.”).
Justice Seward Barculo, author of the opinion in Haring, stated that he as a trial judge put
some limits on the rule that a plaintiff should be nonsuited if a contrary verdict would be set
aside as against evidence. See Haring, 13 Barb. at 16 (“I am not, however, prepared to subscribe
to the doctrine of nonsuiting, to the extent of applying it in all cases, where a verdict may be set
aside, as against evidence.  I find cases occasionally at the circuit, so complicated or so evenly
balanced, that I feel bound to submit them to a jury; and after they have found a verdict, I feel
equally bound, on a re-examination of the case, to set the verdict aside and submit it to a second
jury.  If the second jury find a similar verdict, I suffer it to stand. This I understand to be the
correct practice.  (Fowler v. The Aetna Fire Ins. Co. 7 Wend. 275. Graham on New Trials.)  But
the case before us is not of that character.”).
214 Ernst v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 9 (1866).
215 Id. at 10.
216 Id.
217 See id.  At the first trial, the trial judge nonsuited the plaintiff.  On appeal to the Gen-
eral Term of the Supreme Court, the court granted a new trial because the evidence was not so
clear that a verdict for the plaintiff would have been set aside as against evidence and a new trial
ordered.  Ernst v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 32 Barb. 159, 161–64 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1860).
218 Ernst v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 24 How. Pr. 97 (N.Y. 1862).
219 Id. at 104.
220 Id. (“I deny that verdicts finding negligence are not just as much the subjects of review
in the courts, as verdicts for any other causes of action.”).
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devoted a lifetime to the study of law and to the practical administra-
tion of public justice.”221  By contrast, jurors “are selected from the
body of the people, for a single occasion, and, as a general rule, are
unfamiliar with . . . the principles of law, and the processes of legal
investigation.”222  Although Judge Smith called trial by jury “a noble
institution,”223 his opinion made it sound anything but.  The opinion is
worth quoting at length because of its remarkable contrast between
judge and jury.
[I]t is essential . . . that juries be carefully confined to their
legitimate province, and that the rights and interests of soci-
ety be not jeopardized by capricious verdicts, rendered and
depending upon uncertain principles.  It is of infinite conse-
quence to the community that the law be kept and preserved
as certain, clear, known and stable as possible.  This can only
be done by the courts, and this duty is specially confided to
them, and required at their hands by the people.
This necessity makes it the duty of the courts to regulate
the conduct of juries, to pass upon the evidence submitted to
them, and to decide all questions of law arising during the
progress of a trial; and to review their verdicts, and to set
them aside, if unwarranted by the evidence.
The court is necessarily the ultimate judge in all cases
upon the evidence, and must decide whether in conformity
with the rules of law it will warrant or sustain a verdict.
The argument that it belongs to the jury to pass conclu-
sively upon the evidence, is fundamentally unsound and un-
true, and the argument that the opinion of twelve men in the
jury-box is of higher authority upon a question of fact, and
better evidence of the truth than the opinion of the judges, is
more specious than sound . . . .
The decisions of courts and juries stand upon a very dif-
ferent footing.
Aside from the difference in capacity to decide cor-
rectly, arising from professional education and practice, and
judicial experience, the judges act and decide deliberately,
after patient and careful investigation, and give the reasons
for their decisions, which are open to the careful scrutiny of
the parties, and the vigilant criticism of an educated and en-
lightened bar, and of the public.
221 Id. at 105.
222 Id.
223 Id.
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Juries will certainly act and decide more or less hastily,
without time, in most instances, for much reflection, and also
act and decide in secret; and from this consideration, and
their large number, they certainly act under much less per-
sonal and individual responsibility than the judges; and be-
sides, common observation and experience show that they
are far more liable to be swayed by passion and excitement,
and other undue influences.  Their verdicts are therefore no-
toriously many times founded upon mistakes, misconcep-
tions and other errors, which make it indispensable, to secure
to this mode of trial the public confidence, that a power of
supervision and review of the verdicts should exist in the
courts, and should be exercised with fidelity and firmness.224
A third trial in the case revealed that much of the testimony
which the railroad had previously produced to prove the deceased’s
negligence (including evidence that he was drunk, driving recklessly,
and that he ignored four persons who told him to stop because a train
was coming) was inaccurate and probably perjurious.225  Nevertheless,
the trial judge nonsuited the plaintiff.226  In its second opinion in the
case, in 1866, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and or-
dered a new trial.227  At the end of his long opinion rehearsing the
facts, Judge John Porter condemned “[t]he struggle of defendants . . .
to induce the courts to resort to artificial refinements [of the law] for
the protection of wrongdoers.”228  He also observed that “[t]here is an
unfortunate and growing tendency to regard human life as of secon-
dary importance, in comparison with the objects of commercial and
corporate enterprise.”229  Judges encouraged this unfortunate ten-
dency by taking doubtful cases from the jury and resolving them in
favor of the defendant.230  Contributory negligence was ordinarily a
question of fact for the jury, “under appropriate instructions, and sub-
ject to the revisory power of the courts.”231  Any errors could be cor-
224 Id. at 105–07.
225 Ernst v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 9, 22 (1866).
226 Id. at 20.
227 Id. at 41.
228 Id. at 40.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 40 (“Suits and appeals multiply, in the constantly increasing ratio of reckless inju-
ries, which nothing could tend more to encourage than this theory of immunity from civil dam-
ages, on the assumption, as matter of law, that a party, over whom an engine is driven, is
culpable for not keeping out of the way, and that the question, whether he was really guilty of
negligence, is not one of fact for a jury.”).
231 Id. at 38.
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rected by ordering a new trial.232  (Later in the nineteenth century, as
time-consuming personal injury cases multiplied, many courts were
not as enthusiastic about the remedy of new trial.233)  Judge Porter
admitted: “Occasional instances occur, where the proof of misconduct
is so clear and decisive, that the judges are bound to pass on the ques-
tion of negligence, as matter of law.”234  The concurring opinion by
Judge Ward Hunt, also finding that a new trial should be held, showed
less alarm.235  Judge Hunt agreed that negligence, including contribu-
tory negligence, was ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, and
commented that the evidence on contributory negligence in that case
was sufficiently doubtful and conflicting that it should go to a jury.236
After a fourth trial in the case, a jury brought in another verdict
for the plaintiff.237  In a third decision in the case in 1868, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the verdict.238  The opinions of the judges were at
pains to reconcile the two previous decisions of the court, and noted
the different state of the evidence.  The opinion of Judge Woodruff
summed up the prevailing belief of the judges: “the case seems to me
one in which, upon this question [of contributory negligence], honest,
intelligent and impartial men may rationally differ,” and therefore the
question should go to the jury, and a nonsuit not be ordered.239  Many
courts later used this standard in describing when a case should be
taken from a jury.240  Although there was a struggle over the proper
role of the judge and jury in contributory negligence cases, New York
courts generally agreed that a nonsuit or directed verdict was appro-
232 Id. at 40 (“If it be true, as is sometimes intimated, even from the bench, that false
verdicts are occasionally rendered on questions like this, the remedy is to set them aside and not
to usurp the prerogative of the jury.”).
233 See supra notes 65–76 and accompanying text.
234 Ernst, 35 N.Y. at 38.
235 Id. at 48 (Hunt, J., concurring).
236 Id.  As a Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court a few years later, Hunt praised the wisdom
of juries in deciding negligence cases brought against railroads.  Sioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873) (“Twelve men of the average of the community, com-
prising men of education and men of little education, men of learning and men whose learning
consists only in what they have themselves seen and heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the
farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, apply their separate experience of the affairs of
life to the facts proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion.  This average judgment thus given it is
the great effort of the law to obtain.  It is assumed that twelve men know more of the common
affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted
facts thus occurring than can a single judge.”).
237 Ernst v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 39 N.Y. 61, 61 (1868).
238 Id. at 66.
239 Id. at 68 (Woodruff, J., concurring).
240 See, e.g., Nash v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 1 N.Y.S. 269, 269–71 (N.Y. Gen. Term.
1888).
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priate if a contrary verdict would be set aside as against the weight of
the evidence.
Before the Civil War, no other American courts appear to have
adopted this standard.  A widely admired 1862 decision of the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court came close, holding that a trial court
should direct a verdict “if the evidence is such that the court would set
aside any number of contrary verdicts rendered upon it.”241  Later in
the nineteenth century, as explained below, the federal courts and
many state courts adopted the standard for directed verdict first de-
scribed in New York.
3. Influential English Cases: Distrust of Juries
For reasons very similar to New York courts, English courts
moved away from the scintilla rule in the 1850s.  The English cases
influenced U.S. federal courts.242  English and federal cases together
were influential in the states.243  In requiring a directed verdict or non-
suit even when there was some evidence for the opposing party, the
English courts were shifting the line between law and fact and demon-
strating their increasing distrust of juries, particularly in cases involv-
ing railroads.
Despite their extensive power to comment on evidence and their
considerable prestige, English judges in the 1850s, like New York
judges, were concerned that juries might disregard their comments in
certain kinds of cases.  This concern was evident in Toomey v.
London, Brighton & South Coast Railway Co.,244 in the Court of Com-
mon Pleas.245  The plaintiff, described as a “poor and illiterate per-
son,” a hawker, was waiting on the platform of a railway station at
night and needed to go to the men’s room.246  He asked a stranger on
the platform, not an employee of the railroad, where it was, and the
stranger said to go to the right.247  The plaintiff did, and found two
doors.248  One of them had a light over it, and had the words “For
gentlemen” painted on it; the other had no light and was painted
“Lamp-room.”249  Plaintiff, in a hurry and unable to read, opened the
241 Denny v. Williams, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 1, 5 (1862).
242 See infra Part III.A.5.
243 See infra Part III.A.6.
244 Toomey v. London, Brighton & S. Coast Ry. Co., (1857) 140 Eng. Rep. 694 (C.P.).
245 Id. at 695.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
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wrong door, stepped forward, and fell down some steps.250  He broke
two ribs and was otherwise seriously hurt.251  The plaintiff sued the
railroad for negligence.252  After evidence was presented, the trial
judge agreed with the defendant that there was no evidence of the
railroad’s negligence to go to a jury, and nonsuited the plaintiff, sub-
ject to the full court’s opinion.253
Before the full court, plaintiff’s counsel argued that the lamp-
room door should have been kept locked, and that because no legal
rule could possibly define negligence in a personal injury case like this
one, the question should be left to the jury.254  The judges of the full
court255 held that there was no evidence of negligence by the railroad
that should have gone to a jury.  “A scintilla of evidence, or a mere
surmise” that there may have been negligence would not justify the
judge in leaving the case to the jury.256  The result “possibly might” be
different if there were evidence to show that the steps were more than
ordinarily dangerous.257  As it was, however, “[i]t is not enough to say
that there was some evidence [of negligence]; for, every person who
has had any experience in courts of justice knows very well that a case
of this sort against a railway company could only be submitted to a
jury with one result.”258
A cluster of cases decided in the 1850s and 1860s shows similar
concern with leaving issues to a jury, although the court’s statement in
Toomey is the most direct expression of the judges’ fears about jurors’
bias.  In Jewel v. Parr,259 the trial judge allowed to go to the jury ques-
tions about payment of a bill of exchange; the jury found for the de-
fendant, but the full court held there was no defense evidence for a
jury and that a verdict should be entered for plaintiff.
Applying the maxim de minimus non curat lex, when we say
that there is no evidence to go to a jury, we do not mean that
there is literally none, but that there is none which ought rea-
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 696.
255 Two of the four judges of the Court of Common Pleas did not take part in the discussion
in Toomey because they were shareholders in the defendant, the railway. Id.
256 Id. (Williams, J.) (Willes, J. agreeing).
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Jewel v. Parr, (1853) 138 Eng. Rep. 1460 (C.P.).
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sonably to satisfy a jury that the fact sought to be proved is
established.260
Wheelton v. Hardisty261 confirmed the abandonment of the scin-
tilla rule and held that defendants, directors of a life insurance com-
pany, were therefore entitled to have a particular issue found for them
in a life insurance case.262  In Ryder v. Wombwell,263 the jury gave a
verdict for the plaintiff, a jeweler who supplied a silver gilt cup and
other items to a wealthy minor, the defendant, who was the son of a
baronet.264  The Court of Exchequer held that the trial judge should
have directed a verdict for the defendant as to the cup, because it was
not a necessity and therefore the agreement for its purchase could be
voided.265
By the mid-nineteenth century, English popular and legal publi-
cations were filling up with criticism of jurors.266  Property qualifica-
tions had been dropped, and a jury might contain poor and
uneducated persons.267  In 1844, an editorial in The Times of London
described the “blunder-headed stupidity” of juries that “alternates
with pertinacious malevolence” to produce perverse verdicts.268  This
distrust of juries, combined with respect for English judges, led to the
gradual suppression of civil jury trial in England, beginning especially
with the County Courts Act of 1846, and encouraged by the Common
Law Procedure Act of 1854.269
4. American Doubts About the Jury
Beginning during the Civil War, many American commentators
also expressed strong doubts about the jury.  In 1861, an anonymous
reviewer in the North American Review, an influential general-interest
review of wide circulation, praised the control English judges had over
civil verdicts and urged American judges to follow their lead.270  Far
260 Id. at 1463 (Maule, J.).
261 Wheelton v. Hardisty, (1857) 120 Eng. Rep. 86 (K.B.).
262 Id. at 98 (Erle, J.).
263 Ryder v. Wombwell, (1868) 4 L.R. Exch. 32.
264 Id. at 39 (Willes, J.).
265 Id. at 38–39.
266 See Conor Hanly, The Decline of Civil Jury Trial in Nineteenth-Century England, 26 J.
LEGAL HIST. 253, 261–62 (2005).
267 Id. at 262.
268 Editorial, TIMES (London), Mar. 20, 1844, at 5; see also, e.g., 13 THE JURIST, Aug. 11,
1849, at 294.
269 Hanly, supra note 266, at 253–55.
270 William Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury, 92 N. AM. REV. 297, 308–09 (1861) (“English
judges at the present day, in civil cases, doubtless convinced of the untrustworthiness of verdicts,
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from being any longer a “necessity,” jury trial had become a “bur-
den.”271  “The duties now discharged by the court and jury should be
allotted to a single tribunal, composed of one or more persons, trained
by study and practice for judicial office, and skilled in the investiga-
tion of facts.”272
Later in the nineteenth century, criticisms of juries grew sharper
still.273  High immigration and growing populist hostility toward rail-
roads and other large corporations caused educated elites to distrust
juries.  The concerns about juries mirrored the growing concerns
about universal suffrage.  An unsigned article in the Atlantic Monthly
in 1879 summarized the change.274  The article declared that “[t]he
democratic principle . . . reached its culmination about 1850,” but
since then “[w]e have received . . . an almost unlimited immigration of
adult foreigners, largely illiterate, of the lowest class and of other
races.”275  Increasingly, “the most intelligent classes of the commu-
nity” were manifesting a “feeling of distrust and fear in regard to the
holders of sovereign power.”276  Commentators complained that juries
had “‘developed agrarian tendencies of an alarming character;’ and
that damage suits invariably went in favor of individuals and against
corporations.”277  Judicial comments and arguments by counsel show
practically invade the province of the jury, and instruct them what and how to decide; and a
verdict is always set aside by the court, if the judge who tried the cause states that he is not
satisfied with its correctness.  The English have always adhered to the form after they have aban-
doned the substance, and the constant practice of their judges is a virtual admission of the inabil-
ity of their common-law system to produce correct results in judicial trials.  Our own judges have
not as yet had the independence and strength to follow their English brethren in this inroad
upon the peculiar province and function of the jury.”).
271 Id. at 309.
272 Id.
273 Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170,
190–92 (1964).
274 Limited Sovereignty in the United States, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1879, at 184,
185–89.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 185; see also Charles F. Adams, Jr., The Protection of the Ballot in National Elec-
tions, J.  SOC. SCI., June 1869, at 91, 108–09; Francis Parkman, The Failure of Universal Suffrage,
127 N. AM. REV. 1, 7 (1878).
277 Note, supra note 273, at 191–92.  The few studies of jury verdicts in personal injury cases
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suggest that juries found in favor of plaintiffs
about seventy percent of the time. See KARSTEN, supra note 22, at 99; Lawrence M. Friedman &
Thomas D. Russell, More Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Litigation, 1901–1910, 34 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 295, 309 (1990); Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1764 (finding, in a study of all tort cases filed
against railroad company defendants in Los Angeles County between 1889 and 1895, twenty-six
verdicts for plaintiffs and thirteen for defendants).  Only about ten to twenty percent of cases
filed reached jury trial.  Lawrence M. Friedman, Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late
19th Century, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 351, 355 (1987); Friedman & Russell, supra, at 307.
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fear of jury bias.278  Counsel for a defendant corporation in an 1891
case in California pleaded that his client not be “handed over to the
tender mercies of another anti-corporation jury.”279  Railroads were
special targets of populist ire.280
5. Federal Cases
Federal and state courts manifested concerns with juries and re-
peatedly cited the four English cases discussed above in abandoning
the scintilla rule.281  The U.S. Supreme Court, in Improvement Co. v.
Munson,282 cited the four cases in commenting that
[f]ormerly it was held that if there was what is called a scin-
tilla of evidence in support of a case the judge was bound to
leave it to the jury, but recent decisions of high authority
have established a more reasonable rule, that in every case,
before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary
question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evi-
dence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can prop-
erly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon
whom the onus of proof is imposed.283
Munson concerned conflicting claims over ownership of land in
Pennsylvania.284  The trial court directed the jury to find for the plain-
tiffs on the ground that there was insufficient evidence of authoriza-
tion of a particular survey.285  The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
trial court’s decision.286
In Pleasants v. Fant,287 the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the stan-
dard for a directed verdict, and held that a trial court should direct a
verdict when it would set aside a contrary verdict as against the weight
278 See, e.g., Dawson v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 4 Ky. L. Rptr. 801, 810 (1883)
(“Owing to the fact that there is in some localities a popular prejudice against corporations, the
courts should, whether the verdict is to be special or general, be careful to have the jury pass
upon, first, the facts necessary to constitute negligence; secondly, if negligence is found, the facts
which should determine the amount of a verdict for compensatory damages; and thirdly, the
elements which should be clearly proved to their satisfaction, to authorize them to go beyond the
rule of compensation; fourthly, the amount of damages to be assessed under either head.”); see
also Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1764–65 nn.356–57.
279 Bellegarde v. S.F. Bridge Co., 27 P. 20, 20 (Cal. 1891).
280 LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 69, at 898–900, 1021–25.
281 See, e.g., Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1871).
282 Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442 (1871).
283 Id. at 448 (emphasis removed).
284 See id. at 442–43.
285 See id. at 446.
286 Id. at 451–52.
287 Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 116 (1874).
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of the evidence.288  The Court cited Munson, and the English cases
Jewell v. Parr and Ryder v. Wombwell.289  The Court emphasized the
need for judicial control over wayward juries: “It is the duty of a court
in its relation to the jury to protect parties from unjust verdicts arising
from ignorance of the rules of law and of evidence, from impulse of
passion or prejudice, or from any other violation of his lawful rights in
the conduct of a trial.”290  The Court also used strong language about
new trials: “Must the court go through the idle ceremony . . . of sub-
mitting to the jury the testimony on which plaintiff relies, when it is
clear to the judicial mind that if the jury should find a verdict in favor
of plaintiff that verdict would be set aside, and a new trial had?  Such
a proposition is absurd . . . .”291
By 1879, spurred on by the growing number of personal injury
cases against railroads in federal court,292 the U.S. Supreme Court de-
scribed directing a verdict when a contrary verdict would be set aside
for insufficient evidence as a “duty” of the federal trial judge: “Such is
the constant practice, and it is a convenient one.  It saves time and
expense.  It gives scientific certainty to the law in its application to the
facts and promotes the ends of justice.”293  The Court consistently
quoted this language through the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries in cases involving directed verdict, many of which concerned
personal injury suits against railroads.294
6. Changing Standards in the State Courts: Docket Pressure
Many state courts followed the lead of the English and federal
courts in changing the standard for a directed verdict or nonsuit.295
288 Id. at 116 (The trial court had instructed the jury: “There is no evidence in this cause
from which the jury can find that the defendant had such an interest in the purchase and sale of
the cotton by Keene & Co. as will make him, the defendant, a partner as to third persons, and
the jury will, therefore, find their verdict for defendant.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
289 Id. at 121 n.9.
290 Id. at 121.
291 Id. at 122.
292 Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins have discussed federal courts’ use of directed
verdicts in personal injury cases against railroads.  Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 2, at 641.
293 Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18 (1879).
294 See, e.g., Pa. R.R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 343 (1933) (quoting same lan-
guage); Barrett v. Virginian Ry. Co., 250 U.S. 473, 476 (1919) (quoting same language).
295 See, e.g., In re Sharon’s Estate, 177 P. 283, 288 (Cal. 1918) (en banc) (“It is not necessary
that there should be an absence of conflict in the evidence.  To deprive the court of the right to
exercise this power [to direct a verdict], if there be a conflict, it must be a substantial one.  There
are numerous decisions to this effect.”); see RULING CASE LAW, supra note 181, at 1068–69;
WIGMORE, supra note 2, at 296–99.
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These courts often cited growing dockets and the desire to avoid new
trial as reasons for the decisions.
Courts in the late nineteenth century were under great pressure
to improve the efficiency of adjudication by avoiding new trial.  Dock-
ets had rapidly increased, and not only was the number of cases rising,
but their complexity was increasing as well.296  The personal injury
cases that crowded dockets in the late nineteenth century, thanks to
railroads and growing industrialization, were often much more com-
plicated than the simple debt cases that had dominated caseloads ear-
lier in the century.  Questions of negligence often involved a number
of witnesses, and sometimes experts, and presented complicated legal
issues.
Some scholars, including Wigmore, have argued that the various
standards for directed verdict were all so malleable that it did not
much matter which a court chose.297  One scholar even called the scin-
tilla doctrine a “judicial legend.”298  The courts, however, seemed to
believe that the standard they announced made a difference.  At least,
the standard allowing directed verdict when a contrary verdict would
be set aside for insufficient evidence was thought to make a difference
in improving the efficiency of litigation.
In 1892, the Supreme Court of Iowa in Meyer v. Houck299 de-
clared that although it had long followed the rule that a motion to
direct a verdict should be treated as a demurrer (which the court
equated with the scintilla rule), it was changing the standard to allow a
court to direct a verdict when the court would set aside a contrary
verdict for insufficient evidence.300  The Iowa Supreme Court exten-
sively quoted English and federal decisions—including Jewell v. Parr,
Ryder v. Wombwell, and Pleasants v. Fant—and cited state decisions
296 George Fisher has described courts’ “exploding civil caseload” in the late nineteenth
century: “Between 1880 and 1900, the number of negligence suits filed in Boston jumped from
about 120 to about 3,300.” GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF
PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 111–14, 123 (2003) (explaining that this docket pressure en-
couraged courts to accept plea bargains in criminal cases); see also John Fabian Witt, The Trans-
formation of Work and the Law of Workplace Accidents, 1842–1910, 107 YALE L.J. 1467, 1483
(1998).
297 See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 2, at 296–99; Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 2, at
639–40.
298 Fleming James, Jr., Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-Control Devices Available
Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REV. 218, 218–19 (1961).
299 Meyer v. Houck, 52 N.W. 235 (Iowa 1892).
300 Id. at 236–37.  The plaintiffs alleged that their debtor, a defendant, mortgaged property
to his wife, the other defendant, in order to defraud the plaintiffs. Id. at 235.  The trial judge
directed a verdict for plaintiffs, and the jury returned the verdict as directed. Id.
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as well, favoring this standard.301  The Iowa Supreme Court declared
that it was “high time” that the state should adopt “the more consis-
tent and logical practice which now generally prevails elsewhere,” and
emphasized the practical benefits of the change.302  The new standard
“will be of material advantage in the trial of cases in the saving of the
time of the trial courts,—time which ought to be devoted to the trans-
action of legitimate business,—and the saving of court expenses to the
counties . . . .”303
Use of new standards facilitated direction of a verdict for the
party having the burden of proof.304  Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court
in Meyer v. Houck approved a directed verdict for the plaintiffs.305
The railroads, with their related quests for efficiency in adjudica-
tion and avoidance of jury verdicts, were some of the most powerful
litigants pushing state courts to adopt new standards.  Railroads faced
enormous numbers of lawsuits from a variety of sources,306 and had
great incentives to end them quickly and favorably.  As explained
above, railroads suffered from popular hostility and therefore sought
to avoid juries unfettered by peremptory instructions.307
Railroads did not always succeed in persuading courts to adopt
new standards, at least in the short term.  Courts, however, felt their
influence throughout the United States.  In Kentucky, for instance,
the Court of Appeals permitted directed verdict (in addition to in-
structing the jury “as in case of a nonsuit”), but adhered to the scin-
tilla rule.308  Very few negligence actions appear in the Kentucky
301 Id. at 236–37.
302 Id. at 237.
303 Id.
304 MILLAR, supra note 2, at 307; WIGMORE, supra note 2, at 300–05; Sunderland, supra
note 39, at 200.
305 Meyer, 52 N.W. at 235.
306 FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 468; LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 69, at 1021.
307 See supra Part III.A.2.
308 See Thompson v. Thompson, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 22, 28 (1856) (“It is not the business of
the court, when testimony has been produced upon both sides conducing to establish the posi-
tions of both parties, to interpose, by way of peremptory instruction, and take from the jury a
consideration and comparison of the testimony of both sides of the controversy.”).  The case
concerned the validity of a will. Id. at 27.  The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that the trial
court’s peremptory instruction in favor of the will was invalid, because there was some evidence
against it and therefore a factual issue for the jury to decide. See id. at 27–28, 31.  The Court of
Appeals agreed with the trial court that the evidence against the will was weak, compared with
the evidence in favor, and that, if the jury had found against the will, the trial court should have
set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial. Id. at 27–28.  There had already been a hung jury
in the case, and it appeared that the trial court was trying to prevent another. Id. at 27.  Counsel
for the proponents of the will argued that will contests were particularly apt to provoke disagree-
ment among jurors, and it was time for judges to step in with strong instructions:
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reports before the 1880s.  Kentucky abolished the disqualification of
civil parties for interest in 1872.309  Beginning in the 1880s, railroads in
reported Kentucky cases began to request directed verdicts in per-
sonal injury actions against them.  In Buford v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co,310 a personal injury suit against a railroad, the Superior
Court of Kentucky (an intermediate appellate court) expressed aston-
ishment that the scintilla rule applied to motions for directed ver-
dict.311  The court suggested that the Court of Appeals was confusing
directed verdict with instructing the jury as in case of a nonsuit.312  The
Superior Court expressed even more surprise at the reason given by
the Court of Appeals: that a new trial would allow a litigant to
strengthen his proof, whereas a peremptory instruction would end the
case.313  The Superior Court retorted: “Now there can be no doubt
that the policy of the law is that litigation shall be speedily ended.”314
Despite the decisions of the Court of Appeals, the Superior Court
decided to brush aside the scintilla rule and apply a new standard:
nothing is more calculated to bring reproach upon the jury
system than a rule which requires a judge to sit as a figure-
head upon the bench, and allow juries, under the influence of
passion, or prejudice or sympathy, to bring in verdicts which
On every jury you will find some who think it their duty to decide whether the
testator has made his will according to law; others who esteem it their duty to in-
quire whether the testator has made a just distribution of his property.  The conse-
quence is that in many courts there can not be had a finding in either way.  Dead
men’s estates are going to waste, and justice stands still.  Is it not, then, a time for
the rigorous exercise of all the power which the courts possess?  What practical
good is to result from sending this case back if, in the opinion of this court, there is
no rational mind which could decide this will invalid?  None, it is supposed.
Id. at 25.  The appellate court agreed that “a strange prejudice exists in the minds of some
against last wills and testaments, unless they make what, in their opinion, is an equal distribution
of the testator’s property among his children.” Id. at 31.  Still, the court would not give trial
courts greater powers to direct verdicts.
309 See Fisher, supra note 188, at 669.
310 Buford v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 5 Ky. L. Rptr. 503 (1883).
311 Id. at 505 (“We confess our surprise at the extreme view taken of this matter by the
Court of Appeals.”).
312 Id. at 504 (“This [standard] seems to the court an entire misconception of the office of a
peremptory instruction.  It must grow out of a confusion of terms; failing to draw the distinction
between a peremptory instruction and an instruction to find as in case of a non suit, which
follows upon the conclusion of plaintiff’s testimony before the defendant’s side has been
heard.”).
313 Id.
314 Id. at 505 (“[W]e do not believe that it was ever intended that a complainant should be
allowed to experiment two or three times with the court and jury to see whether he can make
out a case strong enough to entitle him to a verdict.”).
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the court knows at the time will have to be set aside because
“not sustained by sufficient evidence.”315
After the conclusion of evidence on both sides, the trial judge had
directed a verdict for the defendant railroad.316  The Kentucky Supe-
rior Court denied plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, on the ground that
the evidence for defendant, although not uncontradicted, was over-
whelming.317 Buford went to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which
affirmed its adherence to the scintilla rule for directed verdicts.318  The
Court of Appeals therefore reversed the judgment and remanded.319
Because of the scintilla rule, through the 1880s the Kentucky Court of
Appeals regularly reversed directed verdicts or nonsuits for defendant
railroads.320
B. The Effect of Substantive Tort Doctrines: Contributory
Negligence, Fellow Servant Rule, and Others
Although railroads could not always persuade state courts to
abandon the scintilla rule for directed verdict, they could achieve simi-
315 Id. at 506.  A jury was indeed likely to be moved by “passion, or prejudice or sympathy”
in a case such as Buford.  The plaintiff was a member of a circus that the defendant railroad had
contracted to transport. Id. at 503.  Descending a steep grade, the train cars were thrown from
the track “with great violence,” killing several members of the circus and seriously injuring
others. Id.  Plaintiff’s leg was wrenched from the socket at the ankle joint, and was reset but was
amputated ten days later because of gangrene. Id.  Plaintiff sued the railroad for gross negli-
gence in not having sufficient brakes on the cars and in having defective and rotten cross ties on
the track. Id. at 503–04.  The railroad answered by pleading a settlement with the plaintiff. Id.
at 504. The plaintiff replied that the settlement was procured the day after the wreck, when “his
mind and body were so affected by pain and opiates that the transaction was fraudulent and
void.” Id.  The railroad denied the fraud and pleaded confirmation of the settlement after the
plaintiff had recovered, which the plaintiff denied. Id.
316 Id. at 504.
317 See id. at 508–09.
318 Buford v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 6 Ky. L. Rptr. 263, 264 (1884).
319 Id. at 267.  The court did not order a new trial because the question of fraud was equita-
ble, and the court believed that the rules of equity applied to such issues. See id.
320 See, e.g., White v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co., 12 S.W. 936, 936 (Ky.
1890) (“Such an instruction should not be given, unless, conceding the truth of the evidence
offered, and of every fact which it conduces to prove, the party has no case.”); Eskridge’s Ex’r v.
Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co., 12 S.W. 580, 581 (Ky. 1889) (“The well-established rule in this
state, in determining whether the court ought or not to give a peremptory instruction, is that it is
not enough that the evidence be, in the opinion of the court, such that possibly a new trial should
be awarded in case of verdict in favor of the plaintiff, on the ground it would be against the
weight of evidence; but, if there be evidence conducing to show a right of recovery, however
contradictory it may seem to the court to be, or wherever the preponderance, in the court’s
opinion, may be, the plaintiff may insist on a verdict of the jury.”); Lingenfelter v. Louisville &
Nashville Ry. Co., 4 S.W. 185, 185 (Ky. 1887).
494 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:448
lar results through the use of substantive tort defenses such as contrib-
utory negligence and the fellow servant rule.
In the 1890s, for example, a noticeable shift occurred in Kentucky
decisions.  Without altering the scintilla standard, the Court of Ap-
peals began to affirm increasing numbers of directed verdicts for de-
fendant railroads.  The Court did so based on substantive tort
doctrines, especially the defense of contributory negligence.321  Con-
tributory negligence was particularly valuable to railroads in the nu-
merous track crossing cases.322  In Kentucky, as in other jurisdictions,
the fellow servant rule also facilitated direction of verdicts for defen-
dant railroads.323  In addition, more precise legal definitions of negli-
gence permitted more frequent direction of verdicts.324
A dispute exists in the scholarly literature regarding the extent to
which the doctrine of contributory negligence was a barrier to per-
sonal injury claims in the nineteenth century.  Peter Karsten has ar-
gued, against Wex Malone and Lawrence Friedman, that contributory
negligence was not much of a barrier to recovery.325  Karsten argued
that by 1900, most jurisdictions in the United States required defend-
ants to prove contributory negligence (as opposed to the few jurisdic-
tions such as New York that required a plaintiff to prove he was free
from negligence in order to recover), and that “the high courts of
these jurisdictions directed that the question of the plaintiffs’ contrib-
utory negligence should be left to the jury.”326  As the Kentucky cases
321 See, e.g., Meacham’s Adm’r v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 45 S.W. 363, 364 (Ky.
1898) (affirming directed verdict for defendant on grounds of contributory negligence); Smith v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 30 S.W. 209, 211 (Ky. 1895) (affirming directed verdict for
defendant on grounds of lack of negligence and of contributory negligence); Oatts v. Cincinnati,
New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co., 22 S.W. 330, 331 (Ky. 1893) (affirming directed verdict for
defendant on grounds of lack of negligence and of contributory negligence); White v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R. Co., 22 S.W. 219, 220 (Ky. 1893) (affirming a verdict directed for defendant
railroad in a personal injury action on grounds of contributory negligence); McDermott v. Ky.
Cent. Ry. Co., 20 S.W. 380, 382 (Ky. 1892) (affirming a verdict directed for defendant railroad in
a personal injury action on grounds of contributory negligence and the legal definition of
negligence).
322 See supra note 321.
323 See, e.g., Volz v. Cincinnati & Ohio Ry. Co., 24 S.W. 119, 119 (Ky. 1893).  On the devel-
opment and effects of the fellow servant rule, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 301–02, 481–84;
KARSTEN, supra note 22, at 114–27.
324 See, e.g., Smith v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 30 S.W. at 210.
325 Compare KARSTEN, supra note 22, at 95–101, with FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 470–72,
and Malone, supra note 204, at 164–77.  Gary Schwartz found that the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, and to a lesser extent the Supreme Court of California, tended to leave questions of
contributory negligence to a jury.  Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1762–63.
326 KARSTEN, supra note 22, at 98–99.  In support of this proposition, he relied mainly on
late-nineteenth-century treatises. Id. at 366 n.79.  Karsten acknowledged that the doctrine’s
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illustrate, however, it was not necessarily true that state high courts
left the question of contributory negligence to juries, even if the bur-
den was on defendant to prove it and even if the jurisdiction used the
scintilla standard.
The increasing success of directed verdicts for the railroads
demonstrated the power of the procedure, even in states such as Ken-
tucky that retained the scintilla rule.  At first, retaining the scintilla
rule resulted in reversing directed verdicts for defendant railroads.  A
decade later, however, substantive doctrines facilitated directed ver-
dict, and produced results similar to the new standard.
The railroads’ success in getting directed verdicts based on sub-
stantive tort defenses explains the decline of instructing a jury “as in
case of a nonsuit.”  As described in Part II.F., the defendant had to
make a motion to instruct a jury “as in case of a nonsuit” at the close
of the plaintiff’s evidence.327  In a personal injury case, that meant that
the motion would have to be made before the defendant could intro-
duce evidence to prove a substantive defense such as contributory
negligence.  It was vital for defendant railroads to be able to introduce
evidence in such cases, as a showing of contributory negligence or
other defense would defeat recovery and most jurisdictions put the
burden of proof of contributory negligence on the defendant.328  The
railroads, therefore, had substantial incentive to request a directed
verdict at the close of all the evidence, rather than moving for instruc-
tion as in case of a nonsuit at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence.  As
personal injury cases against railroads began to dominate civil dock-
ets, the procedure that required a defendant to move at the close of
plaintiff’s evidence declined and died.  Directed verdict became the
motion of choice for defendants, and thus the focus of courts’
decisions.
The timing of the decline of instructing a jury as in case of a non-
suit and the rise of directed verdict supports this hypothesis.  In Ken-
tucky, the directed verdict, as distinct from the instruction as in case of
a nonsuit, seems to have been requested only sporadically until the
1880s.  There are only a handful of reported cases up to that time.329
“most common and crucial use by corporate defendants was in railroad crossing, streetcar, and
road and sidewalk suits.” Id. at 99.
327 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
328 See, e.g., supra note 321.
329 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 22, 22 (1856); Chiles v. Boothe,
33 Ky. (3 Dana) 566, 566 (1835); M’Pherson v. Hickmans, 17 Ky. (1 T.B. Mon.) 170, 170 (1824);
Hurt v. Miller, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 336, 336 (1821).  The directed verdict was supposed to be
framed in terms of a hypothetical: “if the jury believe the evidence.” Chiles, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) at
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As explained above, negligence cases only began to appear in signifi-
cant numbers in Kentucky in the 1880s.330  In the mid-1880s, cases in-
volving a request for a directed verdict begin to appear regularly in
the Kentucky reports, and most of these requests were made by de-
fendant railroads in personal injury actions.331
At the same time as reported cases involving directed verdicts
increased, the numbers of cases concerning instruction as in case of a
nonsuit declined.  In the 1880s, the reported Kentucky cases involving
instruction “as in case of a nonsuit” virtually vanish.  I found no re-
ported Kentucky case discussing instruction “as in case of a nonsuit”
between 1882 and 1892.  In the mid-1890s, there seems to have been a
brief revival of the practice.332  The procedure appears to have ceased
entirely after 1895.  It was not declared obsolete in Kentucky, but sim-
ply seems to have fallen out of favor with defendants.  Gradually,
other courts that had once accepted the procedure of instructing the
jury as in case of a nonsuit switched to directed verdict.  Mostly courts
did not explicitly disavow the procedure, but, as in Kentucky, it ap-
pears to have died off because it lost favor with defendants.333  Di-
rected verdict took its place, as that procedure allowed consideration
of the defendant’s evidence.
567–68.  Kentucky courts held that a peremptory instruction was not appropriate in cases in
which there was any conflicting testimony. Thompson, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) at 22; M’Pherson, 17
Ky. (1 T.B. Mon.) at 170.
330 See supra notes 310–20 and accompanying text.
331 See, e.g., Lingenfelter v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 4 S.W. 185, 185 (Ky. 1887);
Nichols v. Chesapeake, Ohio & Sw .R.R. Co., 2 S.W. 181 (Ky. 1886); Tubb’s Adm’r v. Cincinnati
S. R.R., 13 Ky. Op. 890 (1886).  These are only a sampling of the cases during the mid-1880s.  In
the early 1880s, the Kentucky legislature changed the Code of Practice to encourage special
verdicts.  Courts sometimes required juries to return a special verdict in cases involving a defen-
dant railroad in a personal injury action. See Paducah & Elizabethtown R.R. Co. v. Letcher, 5
Ky. L. Rptr. 153, 154 (1883).
332 See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kobs, 30 S.W. 6 (1895).
333 The Illinois Supreme Court was an exception, and it explicitly rejected the procedure,
although the practice had once been well-established in that state. See, e.g., Smith v. Gillett, 50
Ill. 290, 301 (1869) (“It cannot be denied, that excluding the evidence in this case was an instruc-
tion to the jury as in case of a non-suit, a practice which, though once in vogue in this State, has
been long since abolished.  It is superseded by the more proper mode of an instruction, moved
by the defendant to the court, to instruct the jury, if a particular fact essential to a recovery, and
alleged in the declaration, has not been proved, then they should find for the defendant.”);
Deshler v. Beers, 32 Ill. 368, 382–83 (1863) (“The practice of the court precludes it from in-
structing the jury to find as in case of a nonsuit.  The plaintiff in error might, if he chose, have
submitted the case to the jury and asked an instruction, that if the jury found that a certain
material fact was not proved, they should find a verdict in his favor.”).  The Arkansas Supreme
Court appeared to abolish the practice in 1847, only to reinstate it several years later. Compare
Carr v. Crain, 7 Ark. 241, 241 (1847), with Hill, McLean & Co. v. Rucker, 14 Ark. 706, 706
(1854).
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C. Backlash Against the Railroads and Efforts to Promote
Plaintiffs’ Recovery Through Juries
1. Limitations on Defenses in Personal Injury Actions and
Establishment of Wrongful Death Actions
As the struggles in New York and Kentucky courts over taking
railroad cases away from the jury demonstrate, the railroads some-
times faced opposition in the courts.  Some courts chipped away at
prorailroad substantive doctrines such as contributory negligence and
the fellow servant rule,334 and even began to develop proplaintiff rules
such as last clear chance and res ipsa loquitur.335
As popular hostility to railroads grew, legislation and even state
constitutions also hampered railroad success in personal injury ac-
tions.  State legislatures enacted attorney-fee-shifting provisions that
operated specifically against defendant railroads.336  (The U.S. Su-
preme Court, applying a reasonable basis test, held that a Texas provi-
sion enacted in 1889 that operated in this manner violated the Equal
Protection Clause.337)  In 1856, Georgia enacted a statute that allowed
a railroad employee to recover from the railroad for injuries caused by
a fellow servant, so long as the injured worker himself had not been
negligent.338  Other states followed in the 1860s and 1870s.339  Accord-
ing to John Witt, in the 1870s and 1880s, the labor movement began to
focus on reform of work accident law as a central goal.340  “By 1906,
seven state legislatures had abolished the rule of fellow servant while
18 others had modified it insofar as it applied to railroad employment.
Twenty state legislatures had modified the assumption-of-risk doc-
trine; several had even moved to a rule of contributory negligence for
334 See ELY, JR., supra note 176, at 214–16; FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 475–77; KARSTEN,
supra note 22, at 122–26; Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1759–63; Witt, supra note 296, at 1483.
335 FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 477–78; KARSTEN, supra note 22, at 100–01; William E.
Nelson, From Fairness to Efficiency: The Transformation of Tort Law in New York, 1920–1980,
47 BUFF. L. REV. 117, 202–07, 209–11 (1999) (describing the shift from contributory negligence
to comparative negligence in twentieth-century New York, and the development of res ipsa lo-
quitur).  Jed Shugerman has discussed scholarly explanations for the turn to strict liability for
enterprises in tort doctrine in the twentieth century.  Shugerman, supra note 22, at 4 n.21.
Shugerman argued that the shift began to occur earlier. Id. at 4.
336 See Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe´ Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 150, 160–63 (1897) (describing
attorney’s-fee-shifting statutes that operated specifically in cases against railroads in Texas, Ala-
bama, Mississippi, Michigan, and Arkansas).
337 Id. at 157–58.  The U.S. Supreme Court in Ellis discussed the decisions of state supreme
courts invalidating similar legislation under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 160–63.
338 1856 Ga. Laws 155.
339 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 484 n.46.
340 Witt, supra note 296, at 1481–82.
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workplace accidents.”341  Mississippi’s 1890 Constitution limited the
fellow servant rule for railroad employees and prohibited employment
contracts waiving tort liability.342  In 1908, Congress enacted the Fed-
eral Employer’s Liability Act (“FELA”),343 covering railroad employ-
ees engaged in interstate commerce, which abolished the fellow
servant rule and contributory negligence and limited application of
assumption of risk.344
After Lord Campbell’s Act in 1846 allowed actions by depen-
dents for wrongful death in England, American legislatures fol-
lowed.345  The wrongful death provision of Georgia’s employer’s
liability law applied only to railroads; in 1874, the Georgia Supreme
Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the provision—the defen-
dant claimed it was impermissible special interest legislation—because
railroad employees were “engaged in a peculiar and dangerous occu-
pation.”346  The wrongful death statutes included a variety of damage
provisions: Missouri had mandatory damages for wrongful death ac-
tions of $5,000; other statutes capped damages.347  Beginning with
Pennsylvania in 1874, provisions of state constitutions prohibited dam-
age caps in actions for wrongful death or injury to persons or prop-
erty.348  All these provisions tended to give juries more power in
personal injury cases relative to judges.
2. State Constitutional Provisions Barring Directed Verdict and
the Response of the U.S. Supreme Court
Perhaps the most direct affirmation of jury power—and rejection
of judicial control—occurred in two state constitutions.  The
341 Id. at 1483 n.85; see Urofsky, supra note 177, at 84.  The first worker’s compensation act
in the United States, passed in New York in 1910 and followed swiftly by acts in many other
states, gave workers injured on the job an alternative to lawsuits in the courts.  Witt, supra note
296, at 1484.
342 MISS. CONST. art. 7, § 193.
343 Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA), ch. 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006)).
344 Congress passed a version of FELA in 1906, but the U.S. Supreme Court held that
legislation unconstitutional because it covered employees engaged in intrastate as well as inter-
state commerce.  The Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 504 (1908).  The Court held the
1908 legislation, limited to employees in interstate commerce, to be constitutional.  Second Em-
ployers’ Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 46–59 (1912); see ELY, JR., supra note 176, at 218–19 n.37;
WITT, supra note 22, at 137, 189–90.
345 John F. Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American Tort Law, 36
RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1165–71 (2005).
346 Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Oaks, 52 Ga. 410, 414 (1874).
347 Witt, supra note 345, at 1165–68.
348 PA. CONST. of 1874, art. III, § 21 (amended 1915); see Witt, supra note 345, at 1168–69.
2013] THE RISE OF DIRECTED VERDICT 499
Oklahoma Constitution of 1907 provided: “The defense of contribu-
tory negligence or of assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever,
be a question of fact, and shall, at all times, be left to the jury.”349  The
question of taking these cases from the jury had become politically
salient.  The Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma had
adopted the permissive federal standard for taking a case from a jury
in 1903, in a case involving both assumption of risk and contributory
negligence.350  In that case, the trial court had sustained a corpora-
tion’s demurrer.351  The Supreme Court of the Territory applied the
federal standard for a directed verdict, but reversed the judgment and
allowed the case to go to a jury.352  The drafters of the Oklahoma Con-
stitution were taking no chances with results in future cases.  Ari-
zona’s Constitution, which went into effect in 1912, copied the
Oklahoma provision exactly.353
The Supreme Courts of Oklahoma and Arizona duly applied
these provisions.  Each held that courts could not prevent or overturn
jury verdicts for plaintiffs on grounds of contributory negligence or
assumption of risk, although it would have been the duty of a court to
do so in the absence of the constitutional provision.354  In the
Oklahoma case, the decedent had stepped on the track when a train
was approaching in full view and was killed.355
The provisions were sufficiently dramatic that the U.S. Supreme
Court had occasion to address each of them.  Indeed, in addressing
them the Court made some of its most memorable pronouncements
on the effect of the federal Constitution on state jury trial provisions
and on the role of the federal trial judge.  In the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, the defendant, the receiver of a railroad, argued that the
Oklahoma provision deprived him of a vested right in his defense of
contributory negligence, and therefore violated the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.356  The Oklahoma court de-
clared that “‘as a general rule . . . the citizen has no property in a rule
of law,’” but that in any event, the accident occurred after the adop-
349 OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, § 6.
350 Neeley v. Sw. Cotton Seed Oil Co., 75 P. 537, 539 (Okla. 1903).
351 Id. at 538.
352 Id. at 539, 546.
353 ARIZ. CONST. art. XVIII, § 5; see OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, § 6.
354 Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Conwell, 190 P. 88, 90–91 (Ariz. 1920) (assumption of
risk); Dickinson v. Cole, 177 P. 570, 570–71 (Okla. 1918) (contributory negligence).
355 Dickinson, 177 P. at 570.
356 Id. at 570–71.
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tion of the constitution.357  The U.S. Supreme Court, per Justice
Holmes, agreed that the Oklahoma provision did not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment.358  “There is nothing, however, in the Constitu-
tion of the United States or its Amendments that requires a State to
maintain the line with which we are familiar between the functions of
the jury and those of the Court.  It may do away with the jury alto-
gether . . . .  [I]t may confer larger powers upon a jury than those that
generally prevail.  Provisions making the jury judges of the law as well
as of the facts in proceedings for libel are common to England and
some of the States . . . .”359
The states were therefore free to require jury determinations no
matter what the evidence, but was a federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction obliged to follow that rule?  In Herron v. Southern Pacific
Co.,360 a federal trial court in Arizona directed a verdict for the defen-
dant railroad on the ground of contributory negligence.361  The Court
of Appeals was uncertain whether the trial court had to follow the
Arizona constitutional provision, and certified the question to the
U.S. Supreme Court.362  Chief Justice Hughes left no doubt about
what federal courts should do.  “The function of the trial judge in a
federal court is not in any sense a local matter, and state statutes
which would interfere with the appropriate performance of that func-
tion are not binding upon the federal court under either the Conform-
ity Act or the ‘rules of decision’ Act.”363  Federal trial courts were to
follow the law of relations between judge and jury as the U.S. Su-
preme Court described it, not as any state provided.364  That law very
357 Id.
358 Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 55–64 (1919).
359 Id. at 56.
360 Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931).
361 Id. at 92.
362 Id.
363 Id. at 94; see also 28 U.S.C. § 725 (1940) (“The laws of the several States, except where
the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply.”); Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5–6, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (concerning rules
of practice).
364 In the earlier decision of Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913),
then-Justice Hughes in dissent had approved of the federal trial court’s following a Pennsylvania
statute allowing judgment notwithstanding the verdict, under the Conformity Act. Id. at 401
(Hughes, J., dissenting).  The question whether federal trial and appellate courts should follow
state laws regarding jury practice has grown more complicated after Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  Among other issues, the line between substance and procedure is
often not clear. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428–30 (1996).
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much included directed verdict.365
In a trial by jury in a federal court, the judge is not a mere
moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of
assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of
law.  This discharge of the judicial function as at common law
is an essential factor in the process for which the Federal
Constitution provides.366
No matter what power states gave juries, federal courts were to
staunchly do their duty to uphold the law.  It was important to na-
tional interests that the federal courts provide that benefit to litigants
in diversity jurisdiction.
3. Legislative Attacks on Directed Verdict and the Response of
Courts
State legislatures rarely tried to prohibit the procedure of di-
rected verdict.  A likely cause of this reluctance was courts’ oft-stated
belief that the ability to pass on the sufficiency of the evidence was a
necessary attribute of judicial power.367  It was to be expected, there-
fore, that courts would find this authority to be protected by constitu-
tional provisions vesting judicial power in the courts.
As described below, a few states nevertheless attempted legisla-
tive prohibitions.  Virginia courts thwarted the intent of legislation in
that state through drastic procedural maneuvers.  Legislation in Min-
nesota and Wisconsin seemed intended to channel courts’ decisions
into judgment notwithstanding the verdict rather than directed verdict
to promote efficiency.  Minnesota courts accepted this channeling,
reasoning that judicial power over verdicts was still available.  The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, held the act in that state uncon-
stitutional.  In all of these states, the key decisions involved railroads.
Virginia had unusual procedures relating to juries.  Virginia was
one of a tiny number of states whose courts had asserted that directed
verdict was not an accepted practice.368  Instead, Virginia courts tradi-
tionally used a version of demurrer.369  In the early twentieth century,
365 Herron, 283 U.S. at 95.
366 Id.
367 See, e.g., Perry v. Clarke, 6 Miss. (5 Howard) 495, 497 (1841); Thoe v. Chi., Milwaukee
& St. Paul Ry. Co., 195 N.W. 407, 409 (Wis. 1923).
368 See, e.g., Hargrave’s Adm’r v. Shaw Land & Timber Co., 68 S.E. 278, 280 (Va. 1910);
Taylor v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 62 S.E. 798, 799 (Va. 1908).
369 The Virginia legislature codified this procedure in 1906.  Act Relating to Demurrers to
Evidence, ch. 177, 1906 Va. Acts 301, 301.  The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rejected the
scintilla doctrine in 1905; demurrers were to be sustained if a contrary verdict would be set aside
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however, courts generally began to blur previously clear distinctions
between different procedures such as demurrer, nonsuit, and directed
verdict.  Courts were becoming more functionalist and impatient with
procedural niceties.370  In this spirit, several Virginia trial judges began
to direct verdicts.  The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declared
that, if a trial judge directed a verdict rather than sustaining a demur-
rer, the error would be considered harmless as long as sustaining a
demurrer would be legally justified.371
In so holding, the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed several
directed verdicts in favor of railroads and other corporate defendants
in personal injury cases.  These decisions drew criticism.  One com-
mentator in the Virginia Law Register in 1910 regarded “this novel
practice” of directing verdicts “as not only a dangerous departure
from our well known rules of procedure, and as unnecessary, unwise
and inexpedient, but also as an inexcusable and unwarranted usurpa-
tion of the functions of the jury by the judge, and a clear violation of
our laws and constitution . . . .”372  This author added darkly: “I know
of no case in which any of those trial judges who have indulged in this
innovation have sustained a motion to direct a verdict, except in dam-
age suits on motions made by defendant corporations.”373
Shortly after, in 1912, the Virginia legislature enacted a statute
forbidding a trial court to give “a peremptory instruction directing
as against the evidence.  Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. F.W. Stock & Sons, 51 S.E. 161, 165 (Va.
1905).
370 See, e.g., Thoe, 195 N.W. at 410 (“Names are not important.  As before indicated, a
motion to direct a verdict is simply one method of testing the legal sufficiency of the evidence.
Whether it is called a demurrer to the evidence, a motion to direct a verdict, request for peremp-
tory instruction, or what not, is immaterial.  The thing involved is the power of the court to pass
upon the legal sufficiency of the evidence.”).
371 See, e.g., Hargrave’s Adm’r, 68 S.E. at 280 (“Considered as upon a demurrer to the
evidence, we are of opinion that the plaintiff’s intestate was not entitled to recover in this case.
The action of the trial court in directing the jury to find a verdict for the defendant is assigned as
error.  While directing a verdict is not in accordance with the practice in this state, yet where it
appears, as in this case, that no other verdict could have been properly rendered, the error was
harmless, and the judgment will not be reversed on that ground.”); Taylor, 62 S.E. at 799 (“[I]t
matters not that the circuit court practically directed a verdict for the defendant (which it is
conceded is not in accordance with the accepted practice in this state); for it is the well-settled
rule of this court that, where it appears that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in any view of
the case, he cannot have been prejudiced by an erroneous instruction.”).
372 M.J. Fulton, Note, Directing Verdicts, 16 VA. L. REG. 241, 251 (1910).  The Virginia bar
was divided on the use of demurrer as opposed to directed verdict. See Small v. Va. Ry. & Power
Co., 99 S.E. 525, 527 (Va. 1919); Editorial, Directing Verdicts, 16 VA. L. REG. 384, 384–85 (1910);
Samuel C. Graham, Note, Directing Verdicts, 16 VA. L. REG. 401, 401 (1910); Editorial, Instruc-
tions Once Again, 18 VA. L. REG. 141, 143 (1912).
373 Fulton, supra note 372, at 249.
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what verdict the jury shall render.”374  Virginia courts could hardly de-
clare the act unconstitutional, as they had announced many times that
the procedure of directed verdict “is not in accordance with the ac-
cepted practice in this state.”375  To get around the prohibition, Vir-
ginia courts used several different expedients.  One was to give a
hypothetical instruction (“if the jury believe the evidence”) stating the
facts of the case and which party should prevail.376  (Virginia judges
had never had a tradition of commenting on evidence.377)  Another,
which seems to have become the preferred method, was to strike out
or to exclude from the jury all the evidence for plaintiff or for defen-
dant, according to how the trial judge thought the case should come
out.378
In 1913, the Minnesota legislature enacted a statute that prohib-
ited directing a verdict if the opposing party objected.379  As explained
in Part IV, the Minnesota legislature had previously, in 1895, author-
ized courts to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict.380  The 1913
statute did not disturb that power.  (In 1921, the North Dakota legisla-
ture followed the 1913 Minnesota statute, and also included a provi-
sion authorizing judgment notwithstanding the verdict.381)
Prohibiting a directed verdict but allowing judgment notwith-
standing the verdict seems contradictory.  There were, however, rea-
sons for channeling the decision this way.  First, the statute helped to
prevent a final decision in the stress of trial, when a trial judge might
easily make a mistake.  (As explained below, this problem was a ma-
374 1912 Va. Acts 52.
375 Hargrave’s Adm’r, 68 S.E. at 280.
376 See Small, 99 S.E. at 527.
377 See Lerner, supra note 68, at 260.
378 See, e.g., Barksdale v. S. Ry. Co., 148 S.E. 683, 686 (Va. 1929); Fleshman v. Bibb, 88 S.E.
64, 65 (Va. 1916).
379 MINN. STAT. § 80.7998 (1913) (“When at the close of the testimony any party to the
action moves the court to direct a verdict in his favor, and the adverse party objects thereto, such
motion shall be denied and the court shall submit to the jury such issue or issues, within the
pleadings on which any evidence has been taken, as either or any party to the action shall
request.”).
380 1895 Minn. Laws 729–30; see infra notes 485–87 and accompanying text.
381 1921 N.D. Laws 217 (“When at the close of the testimony any party to the action moves
the court to direct a verdict in his favor, and the adverse party objects thereto, such motion shall
be denied and the court shall submit to the jury such issue or issues, within the pleadings on
which any evidence has been taken, as either or any party to the action shall request, but upon a
subsequent motion, by such moving party after verdict rendered in such action, that judgment be
entered notwithstanding the verdict, or if the jury have failed to agree upon a verdict, for a
directed verdict, the court shall grant the same if, upon the evidence as it stood at the time such
motion to direct a verdict was made, the moving party was entitled to such directed verdict.”).
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jor reason for the enactment of statutes allowing judgment notwith-
standing the verdict.)  Second, getting a verdict from a jury potentially
prevented a new trial.  If a judge improperly directed a verdict, which
an appellate court overruled, the case would have to be sent back for
a new trial.  If, however, a judge took a verdict and then erroneously
granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a corrected judgment
could simply be entered on the verdict.382
Whatever the reasons for the 1913 statute, railroad officials were
concerned about any encroachment on a judge’s power to direct a ver-
dict.  A railroad soon urged the Minnesota courts to hold the statute
unconstitutional.383  A Minnesota trial court, apparently under the im-
pression (or wanting to believe) that the plaintiff waived any objection
under the 1913 statute, directed a verdict for defendant railroad in a
case involving a shortage in a shipment of barley.384  Plaintiff ap-
pealed, and the railroad argued vigorously that the statute was uncon-
stitutional.385  The Minnesota Supreme Court briskly rejected the
argument.  The court held that, granting that “the Constitution invests
courts with the authority to determine whether or not the evidence
adduced at a trial proves a cause of action or defense,” the statute did
not impair the courts’ authority.386  “It merely regulates or postpones
the time for its exercise.”387  The courts still had the power to grant
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court was less tolerant of legislative in-
terference with the courts’ process.  A Wisconsin statute of 1923 pro-
hibited directed verdict,388 but the statute did not prohibit judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, which the Wisconsin Supreme Court had
previously allowed (although the procedure was not well-estab-
lished).389  In Thoe v. Chicago, Minneapolis & St. Paul Railway Co.,390
382 See Case Note, Trial—Taking Case from Jury—Validity of Statute Prohibiting Directed
Verdict, 37 HARV. L. REV. 510, 510 (1924).
383 Zimmerman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 151 N.W. 412, 413 (Minn. 1915).
384 Id. at 412.
385 Id. at 413.
386 Id.
387 Id.
388 1923 Wis. Sess. Laws 38 (“Whenever in an action tried before a jury all the parties to the
action shall, without reservation, move the court to direct a verdict, such motion shall, unless
otherwise directed by the court before the discharge of the jury, be considered as equivalent to a
stipulation by the parties waiving a jury trial and submitting the entire case to the court for
decision of the facts as well as the law; but in no case where a jury has been selected for the trial of
a cause and any testimony been taken or evidence introduced, shall a verdict be directed by the
trial judge, except upon consent and stipulation of all parties to the cause, or for error, in which
case a new trial shall be had.”).
389 See, e.g., Muench v. Heinemann, 96 N.W. 800, 803 (Wis. 1903).
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the court held the statute unconstitutional.391 Thoe was a railroad
crossing case, and the trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant
railroad on the ground of contributory negligence.392  The Wisconsin
Supreme Court declared its continued support for the scintilla stan-
dard, by that time rare, but affirmed the directed verdict and held the
statute invalid.393  “From time immemorial, in the common-law courts
of this country and in England, it has been the duty and province of
the court to determine the legal sufficiency of the evidence.”394  That
authority “is of the very essence of judicial power; that is, the power to
determine under the law the rights of parties properly before it.”395
The court rejected the contention that judicial power was preserved
because the courts still had the authority to enter judgment notwith-
standing the verdict.396  The court feared a slippery slope in the dimin-
ishment of judicial power.397  Plaintiff urged the two reasons discussed
above, judicial error and the possible need for a new trial, in support
of the statute.398  The court responded that trial courts rarely made
mistakes in the decision whether to direct a verdict, and in any event
had the power to get a verdict from a jury subject to the opinion of the
court on a matter of law in doubtful cases.399
4. A Shift Toward Favoring Jury Power Among Judges and
Commentators Starting at the Turn of the Century: The
Case of New York
At the turn of the century, opinion among certain judges and le-
gal commentators started to shift in favor of greater jury autonomy.400
390 Thoe v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 195 N.W. 407 (Wis. 1923).
391 Id. at 411.
392 Id. at 408.
393 See id. at 409–10.
394 Id. at 408–09.
395 Id. at 409.
396 Id. at 410 (“What is the legal effect of submitting a case to the jury for its verdict?  It is
under all circumstances a determination by the court that the evidence is legally sufficient to
warrant a finding by the jury in favor of either of the parties to the cause.”).
397 See id. at 410–11 (“An infraction of the Constitution is to be measured, not by its size,
but by its character.  If the exercise of judicial power may be thus diminished and limited, it is
subject to further and other limitations.”).
398 See id.
399 Id. at 411.  The court also commented on what it perceived as a growing impatience with
separation of powers, and also hewed to the notion of judicial duty, as opposed to judicial policy
choices. See id.
400 William Nelson has remarked that in the twentieth century generally, appellate courts in
New York strove to protect jury power from intrusions by trial courts.  Nelson, supra note 4, at
1189.  He also briefly observed that New York courts could not direct a verdict on a disputed
question of fact. Id. at 1191.  The account here generally accords with those statements, and
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Out of concern to provide recovery for plaintiffs in personal injury
cases, a few state courts tightened the standard for directed verdict.401
These courts essentially seem to have tried to return to the scintilla
standard.  At about this time, some legal commentators also seemed
sympathetic to jury power, and began to raise concerns about consti-
tutional rights to jury trial which had been almost wholly ignored
before.402  As described below, in response to decisions of the New
York courts that limited directed verdicts, the New York legislature
tried to restore the previous standard for directing a verdict.  Concern
about the proliferation of new trials caused by the limitation of di-
rected verdict seems to have motivated the legislation.  Many of the
reveals a complicated history.  Nelson describes other rules to support the proposition that “[i]n
the early 1920s, the [New York] courts openly interpreted the rules [of jury trial] to favor typi-
cally upper-class defendants and thereby to prevent use of the law, especially in tort cases, to
redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor.” Id.  Although it may be true that some specific
interpretations of rules favored defendants, the crucial judicial decisions permitting jury trial and
limiting directed verdict did not operate in favor of defendants compared with late nineteenth
century decisions; quite the contrary.
401 See, e.g., McDonald v. Metro. St. Ry. Co., 60 N.E. 282, 283 (N.Y. 1901).  Several decades
later, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a similar holding.  Blumb v. Getz, 8 N.E.2d 620, 622–23
(Ill. 1937).  In Blumb v. Getz, plaintiff’s own witnesses testified that the deceased, while walking
on the side of a highway with his back to traffic, stepped into the road. Id. at 621.  As he bent to
pick up a glove, the defendant’s car hit him. Id.  The defendant was traveling about fifty miles
per hour and was twenty or twenty-five feet away from the deceased when he stepped into the
road. Id. at 621–22.  In Illinois, the plaintiff had to show, as part of the prima facie case, that the
deceased was free from contributory negligence. See Newell v. Cleveland, Cinncinati, Chi. & St.
Louis Ry. Co., 104 N.E. 223, 224 (Ill. 1914).  The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a
directed verdict, and the jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff. Blumb, 8 N.E.2d at 622–23.
The intermediate court of appeals granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 621.  The
Illinois Supreme Court reversed, because the deceased might have seen the oncoming car and
believed he had time to get out of the way. Id.  A new trial was necessary. Id. at 622–23.  A case
note in The University of Chicago Law Review complained that the decision was “a throwback to
the ‘scintilla of evidence’ rule,” and that it “emasculates” the judicial power to direct a verdict
and to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  Note, Practice—Scintilla of Evidence Held
Sufficient to Prevent Directed Verdict, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316–17 (1938).  The case was con-
trary to the trend to give judges more power to direct verdicts. Id. at 317.  The author speculated
that judicial hostility toward the minority rule requiring a plaintiff to prove lack of contributory
negligence might have caused the decision. Id.  Regardless of the reason, the result was
“deplorable” because it was likely to cause repeated new trials. Id. at 318.
402 See, e.g., Note, supra note 182, at 257 (arguing that a strong power to direct verdicts was
“undermining our cherished tradition that the determination of such facts is for the jury”); Edi-
torial, Direction of Verdicts in Jury Cases, 1 N.Y. L. REV. 97, 99–103 (1923) (questioning the
constitutionality of legislation expanding directed verdict); Fulton, supra note 372, at 251 (calling
directed verdict “a clear violation of [Virginia’s] laws and constitution”); Hackett, supra note 2
(laying out an extended argument that the directed verdict procedure violates the Seventh
Amendment); Note, supra note 181, at 515 (complaining that courts were too zealous in encour-
aging directed verdicts and questioning the constitutionality of the procedure); Smith, supra note
138, at 125–32 (discussing and favoring the constitutionality of the legislation).
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major cases in New York concerned personal injury actions against
railroads or street car companies.
In the late nineteenth century, the New York Court of Appeals
had several times firmly declared that a verdict should be directed
when the opposite verdict would be set aside as contrary to the evi-
dence.403  At the very beginning of the twentieth century, however, the
Court of Appeals decisively swung in the other direction, back toward
the scintilla rule.  The court began to emphasize that the credibility of
contradictory witnesses was for the jury to determine.404  The leading
case, McDonald v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co.,405 concerned an
action against a streetcar company for personal injuries resulting in
the death of the plaintiff’s intestate.406  The trial court directed a ver-
dict for the defendant.407  The Court of Appeals declared that al-
though “there was a direct and somewhat severe conflict in the
evidence, the questions of negligence and contributory negligence
were clearly of fact, and were for the jury, and not for the court, unless
the right of trial by jury has been partially, if not wholly, abolished.”408
A court could set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence
and grant a new trial, but it could not direct a verdict unless there was
“no evidence” to sustain an opposite verdict.409
Following McDonald, New York courts adhered to a rule that, in
a case in which there was some evidence on both sides of a factual
dispute, the case would go to a jury without a peremptory instruc-
403 See, e.g., Leinkauf v. Lombard, 33 N.E. 472, 474–75 (N.Y. 1893) (citing numerous New
York, English, and federal cases); Hemmens v. Nelson, 34 N.E. 342, 346 (N.Y. 1893) (after five
trials in the case, stating that “this court is now firmly committed to the more modern and rea-
sonable rule” declared in Leinkauf v. Lombard); Dwight v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 8 N.E. 654,
661–62 (N.Y. 1886).  One 1887 case, however, suggested a different standard for setting aside a
verdict than for directing a verdict.  Bagley v. Bowe, 11 N.E. 386, 389 (N.Y. 1887).
404 In an action by an endorsee against the drawer of a check, there were three trials, all
resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff.  Fealey v. Bull, 57 N.E. 631, 631 (N.Y. 1900).  After the first
trial, the appellate division set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence, and as the
evidence remained substantially the same at the later trials, the defendant argued that the trial
court should have directed a verdict. Id.  The court of appeals disagreed.  “Where, however, the
right to a verdict depends on the credibility to be accorded witnesses, and the testimony is not
incredible or insufficient as a matter of law, the question of fact is for the jury to determine.” Id.
at 632.  The court held that the plaintiff’s story “was not incredible, as a matter of law, though it
contained improbabilities, and may have been open to suspicion.  In some matters she was con-
tradicted by the defendant’s witnesses.” Id.
405 McDonald v. Metro. St. Ry. Co., 60 N.E. 282 (N.Y. 1901).
406 Id. at 282.
407 Id. at 283.
408 Id.
409 Id.
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tion.410  As the scintilla rule had earlier, this rule sometimes led to
protracted struggles between judges and juries.  A jury would bring in
a verdict which a trial or appellate court considered unjustified, the
court would set aside the verdict, and a subsequent jury or juries
would render a similar verdict on substantially the same evidence.
Often courts would give up after the second jury verdict, but some-
times three or even four trials would be held in the same case.411  The
cases in which judge and jury tended to disagree most were cases
brought against a railroad or corporation.412  Two separate legal com-
mentators remarked that these contests between judges and juries
were “undignified.”413  One of the commentators also mentioned the
expense and inefficiency of repeated trials.414
Because of this problem of repeated trials, the New York legisla-
ture in 1921 added a new section to the New York Civil Practice Act:
“The judge may direct a verdict when he would set aside a contrary
verdict as against the weight of the evidence.”415  The provision pro-
voked a vigorous discussion among members of the bar.  In 1923, the
New York legislature voted to repeal the section, but Governor Al
Smith vetoed the repeal.416  Smith, who became the Democratic candi-
date for president in 1928, was a Progressive advocate of reforms pro-
moting governmental efficiency.417  The provision provoked several
410 See, e.g., Getty v. Roger Williams Silver Co., 116 N.E. 381, 382 (N.Y. 1917); Seyford v. S.
Pac. Co., 111 N.E. 248, 248–49 (N.Y. 1916); Padbury v. Metro. St. Ry. Co., 75 N.Y.S. 952, 952
(N.Y. App. Div. 1902).
411 Editorial, supra note 402, at 98–99; Smith, supra note 138, at 122–23.
412 See, e.g., Meinrenken v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson Riv. R.R. Co., 92 N.Y.S. 1015, 1016–17
(N.Y. App. Div. 1905) (“This judgment is based upon a verdict which, in the opinion of this
court, the jury had no right to render, and it has so declared on the two previous appeals.”)
(setting aside the third jury verdict for plaintiff as against the weight of the evidence); Williams v.
Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co., 80 N.Y.S. 945, 946 (N.Y. App. Div. 1903) (allowing a fourth
jury verdict for plaintiff to stand); McCann v. N.Y. & Queens Cnty. Ry. Co., 76 N.Y.S. 684,
685–86 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902) (allowing a fourth jury verdict for plaintiff to stand).
413 Editorial, supra note 402, at 99 (adding that the situation is “unsatisfactory and confus-
ing”); Smith, supra note 138, at 122.
414 Smith, supra note 138, at 123.
415 1921 N.Y. Laws 149 (codified as New York Civil Practice Act § 457-a).  Three separate
commentators identified the problem of repeated new trials as the cause of the legislation.  Note,
supra note 182, at 257; Editorial, supra note 402, at 99; Smith, supra note 138, at 124.
416 Smith, supra note 138, at 111.
417 ROBERT A. SLAYTON, EMPIRE STATESMAN: THE RISE AND REDEMPTION OF AL SMITH
156–69, 259 (2001).
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commentators to discuss its constitutionality,418 but New York courts
repeatedly dodged the constitutional question.419
In the following decades, New York appellate courts often
adopted an interpretation of the provision that contradicted its pur-
pose, and indeed its words, and seemed to return to the McDonald
test.420  The New York Court of Appeals in the middle of the twenti-
eth century actually cited McDonald as good authority when inter-
preting the section, completely reversing the intent of the statute.421
In 1949, the New York Judicial Council stated: “There should no
longer be any question but that a trial court may not direct a verdict
simply because it would set aside a contrary verdict as against the
weight of the evidence.”422  Trial judges occasionally protested the ju-
dicial gutting of the statute.423  In 1962, the legislature removed men-
tion of the standard when it recodified New York civil procedure in
the Civil Practice Law and Rules.424
418 See supra note 402.
419 See, e.g., Loewinthan v. Le Vine, 87 N.E.2d 303, 305 (N.Y. 1949); Goldberg v. Price, 205
N.Y.S. 391, 391 (N.Y. App. Term 1924).
420 See, e.g., Loewinthan, 87 N.E.2d at 305–06; Blum v. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 54
N.E.2d 809, 810–11 (N.Y. 1944); Wearever Upholstery & Furniture Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 141
N.Y.S.2d 107, 109–10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955).
421 See, e.g., Blum, 54 N.E.2d at 811.
422 N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 250 (1949).  The Report elabo-
rated: “Briefly, a trial court may under existing case law direct a verdict when, looking only to
the evidence of the party against whom the motion for a directed verdict is made and accepting
as true the testimony of that party’s witnesses, the court would be required to set aside a verdict
in favor of the party against whom the motion was interposed on the ground that the evidence
was as a matter of law insufficient to support such a verdict.” Id.
423 A trial judge in 1956, for example, remarked that “the credible evidence obviously es-
tablished plaintiff’s attempt at suicide” in an action against the New York City Transit Authority
for injuries suffered from being run over by a subway car.  Buccanon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 151
N.Y.S.2d 188, 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956).  Nevertheless, because of appellate court decisions, he
felt obliged to allow the case to go to a jury without a peremptory instruction. Id. at 189.  The
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, which the judge then set aside as against the weight of
the evidence.  Id.  The judge commented that the discrepancy between the plain words of the
statute and the interpretation of the appellate courts put trial judges in a difficult position. Id.
He recommended either that the statute be repealed, or that the appellate courts “reaffirm sup-
port for directed verdicts in accordance with the requirements of the statute.” Id.
424 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 308, as amended by 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 315, § 1 (codified at N.Y.
C.P.L.R. Rule 4401 (McKinney 2006)) (“Any party may move for judgment with respect to a
cause of action or issue upon the ground that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, after the close of the evidence presented by an opposing party with respect to such
cause of action or issue, or at any time on the basis of admissions.  Grounds for the motion shall
be specified.”).
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D. Growing Interest in Finality and Avoiding the Form of
Submitting a Case to a Jury
1. Finality
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts in-
creasingly emphasized the finality of directed verdict to further effi-
ciency in adjudication.  Courts stressed that a directed verdict was a
final decision on the merits and was res judicata,425 and therefore un-
like a nonsuit.426  In 1903, the Nebraska Supreme Court scolded a trial
court which had granted plaintiff’s motion to dismiss an action with-
out prejudice after the court had decided to direct a verdict for defen-
dant, but before the court had actually directed the jury.427  The
Nebraska Supreme Court compared the dismissal without prejudice to
granting the plaintiff a new trial after he had been fairly defeated, and
declared forcefully: “[I]t would be a reproach to our judicial system to
permit a defeated litigant to abandon his case and sue again, thus
harassing the defendant and wasting money raised by taxation for
public purposes.”428
2. The Jury Verdict Under the Judge’s Direction As a
“Ministerial Act” and “Useless”
The procedure of actually requiring a jury verdict under the
judge’s direction may have eased the transition from decision by the
jury to decision by the judge, but late nineteenth and early twentieth
century judges grew increasingly impatient with such “useless” for-
malities.429  The Nebraska Supreme Court, in the 1903 case described
above, called this standard procedure of the judge directing, the jury
agreeing, and the clerk recording “mere ceremonial acts,” “conven-
425 See, e.g., McCown v. Muldrow, 74 S.E. 386, 392 (S.C. 1912).
426 Id. at 392 (“A motion for a nonsuit, on the ground that there is no testimony tending to
sustain the material allegations of the complaint, does not involve the merits, and the granting of
such motion would not support a plea of res adjudicata.”); In re Sharon’s Estate, 177 P. 283, 289
(Cal. 1918) (en banc) (“A verdict directed by the court is a decision upon the merits of the case.
The one important difference in this respect between a judgment of nonsuit and a judgment on a
directed verdict is that the latter is a bar to another action for the same cause, while the former is
not.”); MILLAR, supra note 2, at 300.
427 Bee Bldg. Co. v. Dalton, 93 N.W. 930, 931 (Neb. 1903) (suit for personal injury).
428 Id. (rejecting the argument that the dismissal was within the discretionary power of the
trial court, as there was no surprise, mistake, accident, or suggestion plaintiff did not produce all
the evidence obtainable); see also Gooch v. Coleman, 109 So. 18, 19 (Miss. 1926) (holding that it
was not error for a trial court to refuse to grant a nonsuit if the request was made after the court
had announced it would give a peremptory instruction for the defendant); Schaffer v. Deemer
Mfg. Co., 66 So. 736, 737 (Miss. 1914) (same).
429 Bee Bldg. Co., 93 N.W. at 931.
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tional procedure,” and “judicial formalism.”430  The court criticized
this procedure as “useless and idle,” and remarked that “it would be
legal and logical, and in harmony with modern methods of transacting
business,” for the trial judge simply to render judgment for the defen-
dant if the plaintiff had failed to make a case, rather than going
through the form of submitting the case to the jury.431  Other courts
agreed that the jury’s acquiescence in a directed verdict was “mere
ceremony.”432
3. The Problem of Recalcitrant Jurors
Special difficulties arose with the procedure of formally submit-
ting the case to the jury in those rare instances in which the jury re-
fused to acquiesce in the judge’s direction.  As described in Part II.A.,
before the Civil War, the remedy for a jury verdict against the judge’s
direction was a new trial.433  Another jury was needed to bring in the
correct verdict.  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
judges had less concern with preserving the appearance of jury
power.434  As discussed below, courts approved of pressuring recalci-
trant jurors, even of threatening them with contempt, and increasingly
allowed trial judges to bypass verdicts of full juries altogether in di-
rected verdict cases.  In the process, the procedure of directed verdict
became ever more distinct from that of comment on the evidence.
Judges’ growing power also became more open.
Courts approved various methods to pressure jurors to give the
correct verdict.  Appellate courts in the late nineteenth century told
trial judges not to allow a jury to retire for deliberations after a per-
emptory instruction, to help prevent a jury from finding a contrary
verdict.  Jurors were to stay in their seats in the jury box, without con-
sulting with one another, and give the verdict as directed.  The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania so advised a trial court in 1884.435  The
plaintiff in that case had sued a tax collector for trespass.436  The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court indignantly declared that there was no evi-
430 Id.
431 Id.
432 See, e.g., Marion v. Home Mut. Ins. Ass’n of Iowa, 217 N.W. 803, 805 (Iowa 1928); see
also cases cited infra note 464.
433 See supra Part II.A.2.  Some courts also permitted involuntary nonsuit, if the verdict
should have been for the defendant.  This procedure allowed the plaintiff to try again with an-
other jury.
434 See Lon Hocker, Jr., Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Jury’s Disobedience to Di-
rection of Verdict, 4 INS. COUNS. J., Oct. 1937, at 64, 65–70.
435 Wade v. Fahrig, 4 Pennyp. 252, 255 (Pa. 1884).
436 Id. at 253.
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dence whatsoever to support the action.437  The trial judge directed a
verdict for the defendant, but then allowed the jury to retire, and the
jury came in with a verdict for the plaintiff.438  The appellate court
announced: “Of course, this could not be . . . . [I]t was the necessary
duty of the court to take a verdict from the jury in favor of the defen-
dant, and not permit them to retire.”439  After such an instruction, to
allow the jury to come in with a contrary verdict “was simply bringing
the Court and the administration of justice into contempt.”440  The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the verdict,
with no suggestion of a new trial.441
In the widely cited case of Curran v. Stein,442 the Court of Ap-
peals of Kentucky in 1901 approved of a trial judge threatening recal-
citrant jurors with contempt,443 231 years after Bushell’s Case
prohibited fining or imprisoning jurors for giving a verdict against the
judge’s direction.444  In Curran v. Stein, the plaintiff sued the defend-
ants, officers of the remains of a reorganized railroad, for money al-
legedly due him for investigating and adjusting claims against the
railroad.445  The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendants.446  As
soon as the court gave the peremptory instruction, a number of jurors
in their seats refused to sign a verdict for the defendants.447  The trial
judge then ordered the jurors to retire to the jury room, and told them
“that, if they did not return a verdict as directed, he would send them
somewhere else.”448  In other words, he threatened to have them jailed
for contempt of court.  “After some time” the jury returned with the
verdict: “In obedience to the peremptory instruction of the court, we,
the jury, find for the defendants.”449  The Kentucky Court of Appeals
approved of the trial court’s threat.  A peremptory instruction “must
be obeyed”: “The verdict, though in form the act of the jury, is really
the act of the court,” and it was appropriate that the jury’s verdict
437 Id. at 254 (“It seems incredible that such a case as this could pass the ordeal of a court of
justice.”).
438 Id. at 255.
439 Id.
440 Id.
441 Id.
442 Curran v. Stein, 60 S.W. 839 (Ky. 1901).
443 See id. at 840.
444 Bushell’s Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.) 1009–10, Vaughan 137, 141–43.
445 Curran, 60 S.W. at 839.
446 Id. at 840.
447 Id.
448 Id.
449 Id.
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referred to the court’s instruction.450  To allow the jury to disobey the
court’s direction “would be to vest the jury with power to review the
decision of the court on the law of the case.”451  The Court remarked
that in some jurisdictions the practice in such cases was to discharge
the jury and enter the judgment.452
Some courts disapproved of coercing jurors, and permitted bypas-
sing a verdict of the full jury.  The Supreme Court of California, in the
influential decision In re Sharon’s Estate,453 held that a verdict could
be taken from three jurors when the other nine disagreed with the
court’s peremptory instruction.454  Appellant sought to prevent distri-
bution of an estate according to the terms of the will, in which he was
not mentioned.455  He claimed that he was the adopted son and only
child of the decedent, and therefore entitled to half the estate.456  At
trial, appellant’s evidence that he was adopted was weak.457  The trial
court directed the jury to find a verdict for the beneficiaries under the
will.458  Nine of the jurors refused to agree to that verdict, and the trial
judge then designated one of the other three jurors to act as foreman,
and to sign the verdict.459  Appellant’s counsel asked that the jury be
polled, but the trial court refused, and entered a decree of distribution
in accordance with the will.460
The California Supreme Court approved the trial court’s actions
and rejected the idea that the only way a judge could enforce a per-
emptory instruction was to proceed against recalcitrant jurors for con-
tempt: “It is obvious that this might easily prove ineffectual or
impracticable, for in such event the refractory jurors would be able to
450 Id.
451 Id.  The Court of Appeals, however, exercised its power to review the trial judge’s deci-
sion on the law, and decided that the peremptory instruction was inappropriate, as there was
evidence for the plaintiff to go to a jury. Id.  (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.)
22 (1856) and Buford v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 5 Ky. L. Rptr. 503 (1883)).
452 Id.  The Supreme Court of Mississippi, however, held that a trial court could not simply
disregard a jury’s verdict against direction and enter the opposite judgment, and that therefore
pressuring the jury to return the correct verdict may have been appropriate.  Banfill v. Byrd, 84
So. 227, 228–29 (Miss. 1920).
453 In re Sharon’s Estate, 177 P. 283 (Cal. 1918) (en banc).
454 Id. at 284, 289.
455 Id. at 284.
456 Id.
457 Id. at 287.  Appellant claimed that the adoption had taken place in San Francisco in
1892; the 1906 earthquake and fire destroyed all court records, including adoption records, in
San Francisco for that time. Id.
458 Id. at 284.
459 Id.
460 Id.
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compel a new trial and thus defeat the exercise by the court of a
power which it clearly possesses.”461  A jury was bound by instructions
on law, and therefore by a peremptory instruction.  “In giving a ver-
dict upon such an order, the jurors do not exercise discretion, but act
ministerially as the instrument by which the court prepares the record
which will support the only judgment that can lawfully be given.”462
The court compared the actions of the jury in such a case with the
actions of the court clerk: “[The jurors] are no more at liberty to re-
fuse obedience than is the clerk when he is directed to do the ministe-
rial act of entering an order or judgment of the court.”463
Some courts permitted dispensing with the jury verdict entirely,
and simply allowed a trial judge to enter judgment on the court’s deci-
sion to direct a verdict.464  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit urged such a course in 1896 in Cahill v. Chicago, Minneapolis
& St. Paul Railway Co.,465 a case in which a juror refused to follow the
trial court’s peremptory instruction.466  Plaintiff sued a railroad for
personal injuries, including the loss of both feet, caused by an engine
backing into her; she had been crossing the tracks at a place where
persons were accustomed to cross morning and evening while going to
and from work.467  The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant,
on the ground that the place where the plaintiff crossed “was not to be
considered a crossing,” and therefore the defendant was not liable for
simple negligence.468  The jurors refused to give a verdict for the de-
461 Id. at 289.
462 Id.
463 Id.  The court added: “In such a case the polling of the jury is a mere useless ceremony
and the law does not require it.” Id.
464 See, e.g., Vitamin Milling Corp. v. Superior Court, 26 P.2d 497 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933)
(holding that a trial court may base a judgment on an order to direct a verdict); Marion v. Home
Mut. Ins. Ass’n of Iowa, 217 N.W. 803, 805 (Iowa 1928) (“The signing of a verdict under direc-
tion of the court is a mere formality, and may be followed or omitted with equal legality.”);
Hairston v. Montgomery, 59 So. 793, 794 (Miss. 1912) (“Had the peremptory instruction re-
quested by appellants been granted, it would not have been necessary for the court to have gone
through the useless formality of having the jury to retire and actually find the verdict directed;
but the court should simply have rendered judgment as if upon verdict found.”); State ex rel.
Witte Hardware Co. v. McElhinney, 100 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Mo. App. 1937) (holding that a trial
judge, faced with a jury which refused to follow the judge’s peremptory instruction, “might un-
questionably have compelled the jury’s obedience to his direction by holding it otherwise in
contempt,” but that “it was the power and duty of the court, both to preserve its own dignity and
to secure plaintiff’s valuable right, to discharge the jury and cause judgment to be entered up in
plaintiff’s favor without the formality of a directed verdict”).
465 Cahill v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 74 F. 285 (7th Cir. 1896).
466 Id. at 289.
467 Id. at 286.
468 Id. at 287.
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fendant, and the judge then told the jury: “Very well.  You may retire
to your room, and return with such a verdict as you may find.”469  The
jury returned unable to reach an agreement, with one juror still refus-
ing to find for defendant.470  The trial judge permitted plaintiff’s coun-
sel to stipulate that a judgment of dismissal might be entered, to have
the same effect as a verdict for defendant under direction of the court,
to which the plaintiff excepted.471  The Seventh Circuit strongly con-
demned the recalcitrant juror, and stated he was liable to be punished
with contempt.472  (The Seventh Circuit’s harsh criticism is the more
notable because it reversed the trial court’s direction of the verdict for
the defendant.473  The appellate court held that the railroad owed a
duty of reasonable care where persons were accustomed to cross the
tracks without objection by the railroad.474)  The court remarked,
however, that “it is not essential that there be a written verdict signed
by jurors or by a foreman.”475  “[I]n cases where the court thinks it
right to do so, it may announce its conclusion in the presence of the
jury and of the parties or their representatives, and direct the entry of
a verdict, without asking the formal assent of the jury.”476
In 1963, an amendment to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure codified this practice, discussed in Part V.B.
IV. JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT: AVOIDANCE
OF NEW TRIAL
Trial judges often had to decide motions for directed verdict
quickly, soon after the close of evidence.  This rush did not allow a
judge to consult the trial transcript, newly available thanks to the sys-
tem of taking down court testimony in shorthand.477  In 1906, the
469 Id. at 289.
470 Id.
471 Id.
472 Id. at 290 (“The conduct of the juror in this instance was in the highest degree reprehen-
sible, and might well have subjected him, and any who encouraged him to persist in his course, to
punishment for contempt.  His conduct was in violation of the law, subversive of authority, and
obstructive of the orderly administration of justice.  In fact, by his course he put in jeopardy the
interests which he assumed to protect, because it is only by treating the case as if the verdict
directed had been returned that we have been able to review the judgment and to order a new
trial.”).
473 See id. at 287.
474 Id.
475 Id. at 290.
476 Id.
477 See, e.g., 1907 Pa. Laws 136 (providing for the appointment of official stenographers).
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court commented on the increasing pressure
on trial courts to decide motions for directed verdict in a hurry:
No doubt when time was not urgent and trials were con-
ducted leisurely, with full argument on every point as it
arose, the system [of directed verdict] worked fairly well.
But with the growing complexity of issues, the constantly in-
creasing pressure upon the trial lists, the taking of testimony
in shorthand, and the consequent hurry of trials, the inconve-
niences became burdensome.478
Also, the jury was waiting to receive instruction and could not be held
for long periods.  The need for a speedy judicial decision was part of
the cost of the concentrated common law jury trial.  Commentators
complained that, because of rushed decisionmaking, trial judges fre-
quently erred in denying motions for directed verdict.479
Once a trial judge had denied a motion for directed verdict and
the jury brought in a verdict, traditional common law rules made it
difficult to avoid a new trial to correct jury error.  The common law
motion for judgment non obstante veredicto traditionally could only be
made by the plaintiff, and could only be based on the record—that is,
the pleadings—and not the evidence at trial.480  (The corresponding
motion for the defendant was motion in arrest of judgment, also based
only on the pleadings.481)  By statute or by judicial decision, judgment
non obstante veredicto became available to either party in a number of
states, but the requirement of relying on the pleadings persisted.482
Although courts were willing to innovate in developing the di-
rected verdict, they generally waited for legislatures to authorize judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict based on the evidence.483  A number
of courts held that without a statute, a court could not entertain a
motion to examine the evidence to overturn a verdict and give judg-
ment for the other party.484  Courts held this cursorily, without giving
478 Dalmas v. Kemble, 64 A. 559, 559 (Pa. 1906).
479 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 36, at 93; Ezra Ripley Thayer, Harvard Law Sch., Address
Before the Law Association of Philadelphia (Jan. 25, 1915), in Judicial Administration, 63 U. PA.
L. REV. 585, 587–88 (1915).
480 Pierce, supra note 36, at 93.
481 MILLAR, supra note 2, at 324.
482 Cruikshank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 77 N.W. 958, 958 (Minn. 1899).
483 An exception was Wisconsin, whose courts permitted judgment notwithstanding the
verdict without a statute. See Muench v. Heinemann, 96 N.W. 800, 803 (Wis. 1903).
484 See, e.g., Tribune Co. v. Dunlap Mfg. Co., 201 Ill. App. 408, 409–10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1916);
Stevens v. City of Chariton, 168 N.W. 310, 311 (Iowa 1918); Christian v. Yarborough, 32 S.E. 383,
384 (N.C. 1899); Bank of Commerce of Sulphur v. Webster, 172 P. 943, 944 (Okla. 1918); see
Pierce, supra note 36, at 94 n.4.
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reasons apart from citing the common law rule.  They may have be-
lieved they had latitude to preserve questions of law for the judge by
directing a verdict, but once a jury had returned a verdict after delib-
eration, entering judgment for the other party based on the evidence
seemed too extreme an interference to undertake without statutory
authorization.
State legislatures began to provide for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, in order to avoid a new trial when a judge should have
directed a verdict.  Minnesota seems to have been the first to do so, in
1895.485  The Minnesota statute allowed either party to move for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative for a new
trial.486  Both the trial court and the appellate court (the state supreme
court) could hear the motion and enter judgment.487  A number of
other states followed Minnesota.488
Some courts downplayed the novelty of the new procedure, and
interpreted the statutes cautiously.  The Minnesota Supreme Court in
1899, for example, declared that, in enacting the statute permitting
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, “the legislature was not creat-
ing a new remedy, but merely extended, as has been done in many
485 1895 Minn. Laws 729–30; see Pierce, supra note 36, at 94.
486 1895 Minn. Laws 729–30.
487 The statute read:
In all cases where at the close of the testimony in the case tried, a motion is made
by either party to the suit requesting the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of
the party making such motion, which motion was denied, the trial court on motion
made that judgment be entered notwithstanding the verdict, or on motion for a new
trial, shall order judgment to be entered in favor of the party who was entitled to
have a verdict directed in his or its favor; and the supreme court of the state on
appeal from an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial in the action in
which such motion was made may order and direct judgment to be entered in favor
of the party who was entitled to have such verdict directed in his or its favor when-
ever it shall appear from the testimony that the party was entitled to have such
motion granted.
Id. The Minnesota legislature amended the statute several times.  In 1913, the legislature re-
quired the trial court to deny a motion for directed verdict whenever the opposing party ob-
jected to it, and to take the verdict of the jury.  The trial or appellate court could then enter
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  1913 Minn. Laws 336–37.  In 1915, the legislature re-
moved the requirement of denying a motion to direct a verdict.  1915 Minn. Laws 37–38.  In
1917, the legislature allowed a judgment to be entered after an erroneous refusal to direct a
verdict when the jury disagreed and were discharged.  1917 Minn. Laws 40–41.  For more discus-
sion of the evolution of the Minnesota statute, see EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, CASES ON PROCE-
DURE ANNOTATED: TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE 435–36 n.77 (1924).
488 See, e.g., 1909 Mass. Acts 174–75 (entitled: “An Act To provide for expediting the final
determination of causes”); 1905 Pa. Laws 286; Roe v. Standard Furniture Co., 83 P. 1109,
1109–10 (Wash. 1906) (citing Ballinger’s Ann. Codes & St. §§ 5056, 6521); see also Pierce, supra
note 36, at 94 n.6.
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other states, the common-law remedy to cases where, upon the evi-
dence, either party was clearly entitled to judgment.”489  In that case, a
farmer had sued an insurance company to recover on a hail policy,
and the defense was that the insured had not given notice of loss
under the terms of the policy.490  The trial court denied the insurance
company’s motion to direct a verdict, and the jury gave a verdict for
the farmer.491  The Minnesota Supreme Court refused to enter judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, even though there was a total ab-
sence of evidence on a material point, because it appeared probable
that the plaintiff had a good cause of action and any technical defect
in the evidence could be cured in another trial.492
V. DIRECTED VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT, AND THE DRAFTERS OF THE FEDERAL RULES
A. The Principal Drafters’ Views About Jury Control
Charles Clark and especially Edson Sunderland, the academics
who became the principal drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, wrote extensively about the changes that had occurred in jury
trial giving judges more power.493  These included directed verdict and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  Clark and Sunderland consid-
ered the civil jury to be a wasteful anachronism.494  Their views were
part of Progressive and later New Deal opinion putting faith in profes-
sional expertise.495  In their academic writings, they championed giving
489 Cruikshank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 77 N.W. 958, 959 (Minn. 1899).
490 Id. at 958.
491 Id.
492 Id.
493 See supra note 39; see also SUNDERLAND, supra note 487.
494 See, e.g., Sunderland, supra note 12.
495 Jerome Frank’s devastating critique of juries, published in 1949 when he was a judge on
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, encapsulates the views of his New Deal col-
leagues and of other critics of the jury system. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND
REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 126–45 (1949).  Frank recommended abolition of the jury, “ex-
cept perhaps in criminal trials.” Id. at 145.  He immediately remarked, however, that it was his
duty as a judge to apply the rules that were supposed to govern jury trials. Id.
Frank’s decisions as a judge reflect the ability to set aside his personal views about the jury.
For example, Frank incurred the disapproval of his colleague Charles Clark in voting to reverse a
grant of summary judgment in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 470 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.); see
id. at 475–80 (Clark, J., dissenting).  Judge Learned Hand voted with Frank in the case.  Like-
wise, in Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952), Frank concurred separately to distin-
guish carefully between the standard for granting a new trial and the standard for directing a
verdict. Id. at 271–72 (Frank, J., concurring).  Frank declared his philosophy on the subject in
another opinion: “[W]hatever may be the views of judges about the jury system, it is their duty to
maintain the function of the jury in all jury trials, until the jury is abolished by legislation and
constitutional amendment.”  United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995, 1001 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.,
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the judge more control over jury verdicts.496  When they drafted the
Federal Rules, not surprisingly they codified the federal trial judge’s
robust powers to direct a verdict or to enter judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.497  Indeed, they took the next logical step and aimed to
avoid jury trial altogether.  Extensive pretrial discovery,498 combined
with the novel summary judgment provision in Rule 56,499 gave judges
the ability to decide issues without summoning a jury at all.
Although Clark’s and Sunderland’s faith in professional expertise
reflected a central tenet of Progressive and New Deal thought, the
idea’s application to the legal system long predated those movements.
As applied to the civil justice system, greater authority for profes-
sional experts—judges—represented a long-term and nearly universal
evolution.  For well over a century before the advent of the Federal
Rules, the legal systems in both England and the United States had
been evolving away from jury power and toward judicial control.  By
the time Clark and Sunderland drafted the Federal Rules in the late
1930s, England had effectively abolished the civil jury.500  Although
some American judges and state legislatures tried to preserve jury
power in personal injury cases, the overwhelming trend was to limit
civil juries.  As technology and commercial transactions grew more
complex, and as docket pressure increased, decisionmaking in legal
cases by a group of untrained laypersons seemed increasingly anoma-
lous.  A populist Democrat such as Senator Thomas Walsh of Mon-
tana might argue for more jury power and greater local control, as he
did in the congressional debates over the Rules Enabling Act501 in the
1920s and 30s.502  But his vision suffered defeat until the newly organ-
ized plaintiffs’ bar gained strength in the 1950s.503  Even then, the
plaintiffs’ bar often preferred efficient settlements to resource-con-
suming jury trials.504
dissenting in part); see ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME
FRANK’S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW 156–58 (1985); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror:
The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudi-
cation Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 140–42 (1988).
496 See, e.g., Sunderland, supra note 12.
497 FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a), (b) (1938).
498 FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37.
499 FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
500 Hanly, supra note 266, at 278.
501 Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, §§ 1–2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074 (2006)).
502 See Subrin, supra note 136, at 996–98.
503 LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 69, at 1060.
504 Id. at 1061.
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Edson Sunderland, a professor at the University of Michigan Law
School, was primarily responsible for drafting the Rules’ unprece-
dented broad discovery and summary judgment provisions.505  During
the decades before, Sunderland energetically filled the pages of vari-
ous law reviews with arguments for controlling or abolishing juries.506
These often highlighted directed verdict or similar procedures.507  In
1913, Sunderland wrote an article about directed verdict for parties
having the burden of proof.508  He painstakingly sorted into categories
many state and federal decisions on the subject.509  To facilitate courts’
ability to direct such verdicts, he proposed a theory: courts were to
treat a party’s failure to deny or to impeach evidence as an implied
admission.510  This doctrine of implied admissions gave the courts the
theoretical basis on which to direct verdicts for the party having the
burden of proof.511  Sunderland expressed his concern forcefully: “Ju-
ries cannot be permitted to exercise blind and unreasoning power to
oppress litigants.  They must conduct themselves as sensible and rea-
sonable men.  They cannot be suffered to base verdicts on caprice,
conjecture, passion or prejudice.”512
As plaintiffs typically have the burden of proof on most issues, it
might be thought that Sunderland’s article was generally proplaintiff.
When Sunderland was writing, however, most states put the burden of
proof of contributory negligence on the defendant.  Immediately after
505 On Sunderland’s role in drafting the Federal Rules, see Subrin, supra note 11, at
697–729.
506 See, e.g., Edson R. Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 HARV.
L. REV. 725, 727 (1926) (“Nothing in the legal development of modern society is more dramatic
than the long war of liberation waged in England against the tyranny of inherited legal tradi-
tions.”); Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 258 (1920) (“The
general verdict is as inscrutable and essentially mysterious as the judgment which issued from
the ancient oracle of Delphi.  Both stand on the same foundation—a presumption of wisdom.
The court protects the jury from all investigation and inquiry as fully as the temple authorities
protected the priestess who spoke to the suppliant votary at the shrine.  It is quite probable that
the law is wise in not permitting jurors to testify as to how they compounded their verdict, for all
stability would disappear if such inquiries were open.  But it does not follow that there is not
some better way of deciding controversies than by means of this mysterious agency.  If the com-
pound cannot be subjected to analysis perhaps it can be dispensed with.”).
507 Sunderland’s interest in methods of jury control is also evident in his 1924 casebook.
See SUNDERLAND, supra note 487.  He included in it long excerpts from cases concerning di-
rected verdict, see id. at 416–36, and discussed in detail the history of Minnesota’s statute author-
izing judgment notwithstanding the verdict, id. at 435–36 n.77.
508 Sunderland, supra note 39.
509 See id. at 201–06.
510 See id. at 208.
511 See id. at 209.
512 Id. at 206.
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expressing his concerns about juries, Sunderland quoted approvingly
from the opinion of a New York judge who criticized a jury’s verdict
for the plaintiff in a personal injury suit against a railroad.513  (The
judge was E. Darwin Smith, the same judge who had written extended
criticisms of juries in the case Ernst v. Hudson River Railroad Co.514)
In this track-crossing case, Judge Smith was concerned that the jury
had improperly discredited or disregarded two witnesses for the de-
fendant.515  Sunderland’s remarks about juries and his quotation from
the New York case indicate that one scenario he feared was that a jury
might disregard “unimpeached, uncontradicted” testimony from a de-
fendant’s witness about contributory negligence.516  In any event, Sun-
derland clearly favored taking as many questions as possible from the
jury.
The following year, in 1914, Sunderland wrote a long article enti-
tled The Inefficiency of the American Jury, in which he argued for a
return of a strong judicial power to comment on evidence.517  He re-
marked that jurors untrained in the law should not decide cases in a
sophisticated commercial economy.518  He praised the continental le-
gal systems, in which decisionmaking was “lodged in courts with a per-
manent personnel of trained lawyers.”519
The future reporter of the committee that drafted the Rules, Yale
Law School Dean Charles Clark, published an empirical study of ju-
ries in Connecticut in 1934 and concluded, with his coauthor Harry
Shulman: “Whatever the political, psychological or jurisprudential val-
ues of the jury as an institution may be, its use in the civil litigation
covered by this study is certainly not impressive.  The picture seems to
513 Id. at 206–07 (quoting Seibert v. Erie Ry. Co., 49 Barb. 583, 586–87 (N.Y. Gen. Term
1867)).
514 See supra text accompanying notes 220–24.
515 Seibert, 49 Barb. at 586–87 (“The positive testimony of an unimpeached, uncontra-
dicted, witness cannot be discredited, or disregarded arbitrarily or capriciously by court or jury.
If juries are permitted to discredit or disregard such testimony, there is no safety in the adminis-
tration of justice, and parties might just as well let the result of a litigation abide the cast of a die,
or a game of chance.  It belongs to a jury, I admit, in considering the weight of evidence, to pass
upon the credit due to the respective witnesses; but this does not imply that they may, without
reasonable or justifiable ground, disbelieve any witness.  They have no right to discredit an
unimpeached, uncontradicted witness, who testifies fairly, and gives clear, rational, consistent
and relevant testimony.” (citation omitted)).  In that case, both the plaintiff and another witness
gave testimony that could be construed as contradicting that of the defendant’s witnesses. Id. at
585.
516 Sunderland, supra note 39, at 206–07 (quoting Seibert, 49 Barb. at 586–87).
517 Sunderland, supra note 12, at 302.
518 Id. at 303.
519 Id.
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be that of an expensive, cumbersome and comparatively inefficient
trial device” that was subject to “exploitation.”520  The authors recom-
mended sharply limiting the power of juries, including through ex-
panded use of summary judgment and diversion of certain classes of
cases to administrative tribunals.521
By the time Clark and Shulman were doing their empirical work,
automobile accidents had replaced railroad accidents as a major
source of personal injury litigation.522  So dominant were automobile
negligence cases that the authors commented: “In the court studied, as
elsewhere in the country, the jury has become identified in very major
part with automobile accident litigation.”523  The typical automobile
accident did not carry the political ramifications of a railroad accident.
Automobile accident cases were likely to involve two private individu-
als as parties, not a large and powerful corporation that spawned
many accidents.524  In the case of a collision between two automobiles,
the force and risk of injury was likely to be roughly equal.  As a result
520 See Clark & Shulman, supra note 39, at 884.  The study concerned cases in the Superior
Court of New Haven County.  The authors found that, of the 571 cases studied during the period
1919–1928 that went to trial, 19, or 3.3%, were resolved by directed verdict. Id. at 879.
521 Id. at 879, 884–85; see also Clark & Samenow, supra note 39, at 423.
522 See Clark & Shulman, supra note 39, at 871 (finding that, of the 296 negligence cases
that went to jury trial in New Haven County between 1919 and 1928 (out of 480 total filed), 193
were automobile cases (of which 330 were filed)); see also WITT, supra note 22, at 194–95;
Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile Accidents, Insurance, and the Challenge
to Social Order in the Inter-War Years, 1919 to 1941, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 521, 539–47 (1998).  Own-
ership of automobiles became widespread in the 1920s, thanks to Henry Ford’s innovations in
methods of production. See Simon, supra, at 531 (“By the end of the 1920s more than half of
American families owned an automobile.”).  Railroads, on the other hand, were increasingly
subject to safety and other regulation by states and the federal government. See ELY, JR., supra
note 176, at 110–34, 217–18.  Workers’ compensation statutes diverted a number of potential tort
claims by employees of railroads, and workplace accident rates fell dramatically. WITT, supra
note 22, at 9–12, 67, 126–51, 187, 189–94.
523 Clark & Shulman, supra note 39, at 885.  The authors further remarked: “Much dissatis-
faction has been expressed with this method of administering compensation for such accidents.”
Id.  Clark was part of a committee that drew up the so-called Columbia Plan of 1932, proposing
an administrative scheme for imposing liability on the owners of automobiles for injuries, similar
to workers’ compensation. See WITT, supra note 22, at 195 (discussing the Columbia Plan and
other schemes for administrative tribunals to process automobile accident claims); Simon, supra
note 522, at 567–85 (discussing the Columbia Plan in detail, and reasons for its failure to be
adopted).
524 Automobile insurance did bring corporations into play, but in most states, the consider-
able majority of motorists did not have accident insurance through the 1920s. See Simon, supra
note 522, at 564 (“Nationally twenty-seven percent of motor vehicles registered in 1929 were
covered by a liability insurance policy.  While the numbers of motorists who purchased liability
insurance varied enormously, in only twelve states were more than a quarter of all motorists
insured.  Only Massachusetts made liability coverage a condition for registration . . . .”).  Insur-
ance companies typically were not parties to accident litigation, and their operations were not
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of the shift to automobile accidents, the jury came to seem less a
frightening channel of popular hostility, and more an encumbering
nuisance.  The change is evident in the dismissive tone of Clark’s and
Shulman’s comments on the jury, as opposed to the alarmed tone of
earlier writing.525
B. The Career of Directed Verdict in the Federal Rules
The drafters could not entirely please themselves in fashioning
the Rules.  Besides complying with the Seventh Amendment, their
draft had to win the approval of the U.S. Supreme Court and not at-
tract serious opposition in Congress.526  The Advisory Committee
therefore had to contend with residual reluctance to interfere too
openly with juries.  Although the drafters of the Federal Rules were
bold in the provisions concerning discovery and summary judgment,
they were somewhat cautious in codifying directed verdict in Rule
50(a) and judgment notwithstanding the verdict in Rule 50(b).  The
original version of Rule 50(a) did not provide that a judge could enter
judgment on the decision to direct a verdict alone, without the agree-
ment of the jury.527  The reason for this caution was most likely that
sentiment existed on the Supreme Court for retaining the pretense of
a jury verdict.  Rule 50(b) did not use the term “judgment notwith-
standing the verdict,” although it gave the trial judge that power.528  In
designing this part of the Rule, the Advisory Committee had to take
into account Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Seventh
Amendment’s Re-examination Clause.529
In 1963, both of these concessions to the jury were eliminated.
The Advisory Committee proposed amending Rule 50(a) to permit
the trial judge to enter judgment without the form of submission to
the direct cause of injury.  They therefore engendered less popular hostility.  On the operation of
the early automobile insurance industry, see id. at 563–67.
525 Compare Sunderland, supra note 39, at 206 (writing in 1913: “Juries cannot be permitted
to exercise blind and unreasoning power to oppress litigants.”), with Clark & Shulman, supra
note 520, at 884 (describing juries in 1934 as “expensive, cumbersome and comparatively
inefficient”).
526 The Rules Enabling Act gave the Supreme Court power to promulgate rules of civil
procedure for the federal district courts, and the Court had to approve the Advisory Commit-
tee’s draft before the rules could be reported to Congress.  Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, §§ 1, 2,
48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074 (2006)).
527 FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) (1938).
528 FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
529 See Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 661 (1935); Slocum v. N.Y. Life
Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 399–400 (1913); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50 advisory committee’s note to
subdivision (b) (1937).
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the jury.530  The Advisory Committee’s notes on the proposed amend-
ment explained: “The practice, after the court has granted a motion
for directed verdict, of requiring the jury to express assent to a verdict
they did not reach by their own deliberations serves no useful purpose
and may give offense to the members of the jury.”531  At the same
time, the Committee proposed changing the title of subdivision (b)
from “Reservation of Decision on Motion” to “Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the verdict.”532  The Supreme Court approved the
amendments.  The pretense of jury involvement was falling away, and
the Rules confirmed the open exercise of judicial power.
In 1991, amendments to Rule 50 went even further in this direc-
tion.  In recommending major revisions to Rule 50(a), indeed merging
it completely with 50(b) and re-entitling the entire rule “Judgment as
a Matter of Law,” the Advisory Committee proclaimed that the pro-
posal “aims to facilitate the exercise by the court of its responsibility
to assure the fidelity of its judgment to the controlling law, a responsi-
bility imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”533
The Fifth Amendment appeared to trump the Seventh.  The Commit-
tee explained at length its decision to abandon the familiar term “di-
rected verdict.”  The Committee called the term “misleading as a
description of the relationship between judge and jury” and “freighted
with anachronisms.”534  The term “judgment as a matter of law,” the
Committee explained, was almost equally familiar and appeared in
Rule 56, concerning summary judgment.535  Its use in Rule 50 high-
lighted the relationship between the two rules.536  The revisions virtu-
ally expunged the jury from Rule 50, but by then it hardly mattered.
Discovery, summary judgment, and settlement had become dominant:
pretrial discovery revealed the facts formerly heard in evidence at
trial, and summary judgment and settlement replaced jury verdicts.
The Rules had facilitated the goal of virtually ending civil jury trials.
530 Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 31
F.R.D. 587, 643 (1963) (proposing adding this sentence to the end of Rule 50(a): “The order of
the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent of the jury.”).
531 Id. at 645.
532 Id. at 643.
533 FED. R. CIV. P. 50 advisory committee’s note to subdivision (a) (1991).  The Committee
also recommended including in the rule the standard for judgment as a matter of law, which had
not appeared previously but was found in case law: “a reasonable jury would not have a legally
sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party.” Id.
534 Id.
535 Id.
536 Id.
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CONCLUSION: THE CONSTANT EVOLUTION OF JURY PRACTICE
The explosion of new jury procedures in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries attest to the constant evolution of common
law systems.  The new procedures included majority verdicts,537 juries
of less than twelve,538 jury trial only by request,539 and limited sum-
mary judgment,540 in addition to expanded use of directed verdict and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure of 1938 introduced powerful mechanisms of pretrial discov-
ery, drawn from equity, and summary judgment, a device for taking a
case away from a jury altogether.541  These new mechanisms have es-
sentially rendered directed verdict, and indeed jury control generally,
obsolete.542  In the early twentieth century, well into the 1930s, legal
periodicals regularly published articles and case notes about methods
of jury control, especially directed verdict and judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict.  Jury control was considered an important topic.  The
following decades, however, saw fewer and fewer mentions of the sub-
ject.  American civil justice systems have moved far toward the goal,
envisioned by the bolder reformers of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, of abolition of the jury. The reformers hoped to
substitute professional decisionmaking, an aim that was partly accom-
plished in summary judgment procedure.543  Expanded use of directed
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict were important
steps on the way.
537 WALTER F. DODD, STATE GOVERNMENT 308 (2d ed. 1923) (“Eighteen state constitu-
tions now expressly provide for or permit a less than unanimous verdict in civil cases in courts of
record.  A number of these constitutions provide that a verdict may be rendered by three-fourths
of the jury in civil cases.”).
538 AUSTIN W. SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS AT LAW 77 n.19 (1922).
539 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 2254, 5624 (1930); see Clark & Samenow, supra note 39, at 464,
467; Clark & Shulman, supra note 39, at 884 n.21.
540 See People’s Wayne Cnty. Bank v. Wolverine Box Co., 230 N.W. 170, 171 (Mich. 1930);
Gen. Inv. Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 139 N.E. 216, 218 (N.Y. 1923).
541 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37, 56 (1938).
542 Scholars have observed that in some jurisdictions later in the twentieth century, courts
had strict standards for directing a verdict. See, e.g., Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 382 N.E.2d
1145, 1148 (N.Y. 1978); Nelson, supra note 4, at 1191.  By that time it was too late to make much
difference.  Civil jury trial was in a death spiral.
543 Constitutional guaranties of civil jury trial remain an obstacle to full substitution of
judicial decisionmaking for jury verdicts.  As a result, the civil justice system has had to make do
with pressuring litigants to settle.  I address the history of interpretations of constitutional rights
to civil jury trial, and the problem of constitutionalizing procedural rights, in a separate paper.
